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Climate change is a reality, growing in significance as the 
potential for rapid and severe disruption of ecological and social 
systems looms ever larger. Transformations such as ecosystem 
collapse, dramatic sea level rise, and a host of other 
disturbances of biophysical systems threaten social and 
economic stability. Against these risks, the world’s 
governments have struggled in international negotiations to 
arrive at even the most modest and clearly insufficient 
agreements,1 while the United States continues to lack 
protective environmental policies to limit greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.2 The need for a new approach is widely 
recognized3 and exceptionally urgent. One promising avenue 
for developing such an approach lies in reconceptualizing 
climate change mitigation as an emergent property of the 
global energy system. 
A growing body of legal literature has begun examining 
energy law—a field which evolved separately from, and has 
only occasionally been significantly constrained by, 
environmental law—in an effort to promote development of 
clean technologies that can ultimately help mitigate climate 
change.4 The present Article also aims to promote renewable 
                                                          
 1. See infra Part I.D.4. 
 2. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change 
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 246–48 
(2011) (providing a historical summary of U.S. climate change initiatives). 
 3. See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 
FACTSHEET 1 (2012) [hereinafter IEA FACTSHEET] (“Taking all new 
developments and policies into account, the world is still failing to put the 
global energy system onto a more sustainable path.”). 
 4. For examples from U.S. legal literature, see JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, 
ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 233–34 (2011) 
(“Historically, energy and the environment were separate ways of viewing the 
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energy technology with a goal of climate change mitigation, but 
offers a different perspective than other recent U.S. legal 
scholarship oriented toward this goal. Rather than focusing on 
how the substance or structure of energy and environmental 
law could be modified, this Article reconceptualizes climate 
change in order to explore the potential for developing 
governance reforms that may rapidly advance mitigation goals 
by catalyzing a transformation of the global energy system. If 
climate change can appropriately be understood as a threat to 
global socio-ecological systems brought about by the 
configuration of the existing global energy system, viable 
solutions will be those that ultimately reconfigure the global 
energy system. 
Drawing on complex systems theory,5 particularly as it has 
been applied in the interdisciplinary socio-ecological systems 
literature and U.S. environmental law analysis, I suggest that 
climate change can be understood as an emergent property of 
the global energy system arising from a highly resilient system 
state in which fossil-fuel-based technology dominates and GHG 
emissions remain high. This perspective leads to policy 
recommendations for addressing climate change aimed at 
catalyzing a transformation of the global energy system to 
dislodge fossil fuel dominance and initiate large-scale diffusion 
of renewable energy technologies. Thinking of reforms in these 
terms offers hope, perhaps the last hope, for significant near-
term mitigation on a global scale because it can avoid the major 
political challenges that have plagued environmental law 
                                                          
world . . . . A smart energy future recognizes the interrelatedness of energy 
and environmental strategies.”); Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the 
Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 491 (2010) (“Putting 
energy law and environmental law side by side yields an immediate contrast. 
The fields work toward different ends.”); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and 
Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1682 
(2012) (“[A]n implicit support structure for fossil energy is written 
into . . . environmental law, and . . . inevitably distort[s] how the costs of 
bringing new energy technologies to scale are perceived.”); Amy J. 
Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and 
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 381 (2011) (finding that 
“environmental law and energy law do very different work[;] [t]hey have 
different aims,” as the former seeks to protect health and conserve resources 
while the latter promotes economic development); see also Hari M. Osofsky & 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 829–31 
(2013) (explaining the substantive overlap between environmental and energy 
law). 
 5. See infra Parts II, III. 
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approaches, including international treaty negotiations6 and 
passage of comprehensive national legislation in the United 
States.7 Instead, this approach involves identifying and 
changing components of the global energy system that may 
accrete, interact, and react in ways that magnify their impact, 
promoting a transformation toward an alternative, low-GHG 
trajectory of the system. 
Although necessarily uncertain and tentative, this 
approach is neither wishful nor magical thinking, as it might at 
first appear to someone who has focused exclusively on linear 
and incremental policy reform. Instead, this approach applies 
widely recognized processes of complex systems, through which 
relatively small adjustments to components of the current 
system state can shift the momentum away from reinforcing 
the current state (fossil energy dominance) through adaptive 
processes and toward a fundamentally different system state 
(such as a renaissance of renewable energy technology).8 The 
proposal is apparently novel in the legal literature,9 but fits 
well with recent work in other disciplines, including a 
significant body of socio-technical systems research and 
                                                          
 6. See infra Part I.D.4. 
 7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. Research for this article did not uncover any articles by legal scholars 
or in legal journals discussing the approach to mitigation proposed here. Only 
English-language literature was searched, and U.S. legal literature was 
reviewed most thoroughly. Moreover, it is important to note that J.B. Ruhl has 
long suggested that complexity theory offers an important perspective on 
environmental law problems and the legal system in general. See generally 
J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern 
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Complexity 
Theory]; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive 
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of 
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997) [hereinafter Ruhl, 
Thinking]. Other works suggest that energy policy must be understood as the 
context in which climate change should be addressed. E.g., Susann Handke & 
Ellen Hey, Climate Change Negotiations in a Changing Global Energy 
Landscape: A Wicked Problem, 2 EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. REFLECTIONS, Sept. 4, 
2013, 1, http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/ESIL%20Reflections%20-
%20Handke%20and%20Hey.pdf. One article, written contemporaneously with 
the present Article, suggests that the global energy system can be understood 
as a complex system. Frank A. Felder, Climate Change Mitigation and the 
Global Energy System, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2014). The present proposal 
may, therefore, be understood as a synthesis, rather than a truly novel 
proposal. Yet, “there is nothing new under the sun.” Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
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nascent political science work developing a methodology for 
identifying appropriate components of legal and political 
systems to target in order to take advantage of path 
dependency characteristics and promote the emergence of more 
effective approaches to global environmental change.10 The 
proposal may also find empirical support in case studies of 
smaller-scale energy system transformations, such as Brazil’s 
move away from fossil energy in the 1970s.11 
The analysis in the balance of this Article suggests that, at 
a minimum, the proposal has sufficient promise to warrant 
further research, as well as serious consideration by policy 
makers and advocacy organizations throughout the world. Part 
I highlights the failure of environmental law approaches to 
produce an effective international climate change mitigation 
response,12 and offers a sketch of several major aspects of the 
global energy policy landscape that suggest its complexity. Part 
II briefly discusses complex systems theory as it has begun to 
influence environmental law scholarship. Part III makes 
explicit the claim that climate change can be understood as an 
emergent property of the global energy system and highlights 
complexity theory concepts to inform law and policy related to 
mitigation, noting particularly the importance of technology 
and the undesirable resilience of systemic properties related to 
climate change. Part IV concludes by offering some preliminary 
suggestions for design principles and operational approaches 
relevant to energy governance reform that could support a far 
more effective response to the mitigation challenge. 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AND 
GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY 
From the early 1990s through 2009, the primary focus of 
efforts to address climate change was on the development of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) regime.13 The UNFCCC approach to climate change 
can be understood as a classic or traditional environmental law 
                                                          
 10. See infra Part III.B. 
 11. See infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. See E. Lisa F. Schipper, Conceptual History of Adaptation in the 
UNFCCC Process, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 82, 82, 85–88 
(2006) (discussing the development of the UNFCCC). 
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response to an environmental problem.14 The regime’s goal is 
framed in environmental law terms of harm prevention—“to 
achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”15—and the 
means to do so were conceived in terms of quantifiable targets 
for the reduction of GHGs.16 Further, most analysis under the 
regime was framed by the “conventional” economic theory of 
preventing a “tragedy of the commons,” which emphasizes the 
need for a legally authoritative institution holding power to 
impose sanctions for non-compliance with binding rules.17 As a 
degree of success was achieved in advancing this structure 
during negotiations toward the Kyoto Protocol, significant 
effort was devoted to developing “flexibility mechanisms” as a 
means of reducing overall compliance costs.18 
The effort to develop international climate change law in 
UNFCCC negotiations drew on past environmental law 
successes—particularly the success of the 1987 Montreal 
                                                          
 14. Cinnamon P. Carlarne, The Future of the UNFCCC: Adaptation and 
Institutional Rebirth for the International Climate Convention 5 (Ohio State 
Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 172, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2148438_code1468587.pdf?a
bstractid=2148438&mirid=2 (describing mitigation policies as the “business as 
usual” approach); see also William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and 
the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen 
Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457, 469 (2010) (describing how focus on 
stabilization targets is currently the “dominant approach to climate 
governance”); Schipper, supra note 13, at 82 (explaining that the UNFCCC 
process was intended to focus on reversing changes in climate by mitigating 
GHG emissions). 
 15. Schipper, supra note 13, at 86. 
 16. See id. at 84 (“[M]itigation focuses on the source of climate 
change . . . .”); Carlarne, supra note 14, at 5 (describing the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol as agreements that have adopted a “targets . . . approach to 
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions”). 
 17. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action 
and Global Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 551 
(2010) (“The conventional theory of collective action predicts . . . [that] an 
external authority is required to impose enforceable rules . . . . [There exists 
the] presumption that collective-action problems that have global effects must 
primarily be ‘solved’ by legal actions of a global authority . . . .”). 
 18. See generally Michael Grubb, Cap and Trade Finds New Energy, 491 
NATURE 666, 666 (2012) (discussing how the “cap-and-trade” model utilized in 
the Kyoto Protocol allowed countries a high level of flexibility in meeting 
reduction targets). 
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Protocol in addressing ozone depletion19 and the Acid Rain 
Program of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments.20 
However, the model of regulation represented by those 
successful programs never fit well with the climate change 
problem.21 Among other reasons, acid rain in the United States 
and global ozone depletion were both caused by a discrete and 
identifiable group of actors within developed countries, and 
technological fixes to the problematic substances were available 
(in the form of alternatives or pollution control devices), which 
meant that framing the problems in terms of harm prevention 
and compliance cost reduction was both accurate and 
effective.22 Climate change, however, does not have either of 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 282 
(1999) (“[T]he Montreal Protocol has served . . . as a useful precedent and 
model for the [UN]FCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.”); Schipper, supra note 13, at 
86 (mentioning that emissions reduction strategies were effectively used in the 
Montreal Protocol). 
 20. The Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Amendments to the U.S. Clean 
Air Act is widely recognized as the first large-scale successful use of a cap-and-
trade program. See Lesley K. McAllister, Enforcing Cap-and-Trade: A Tale of 
Two Programs, 2 SAN DIEGO J. ENERGY & CLIMATE L. 1, 4–9 (2010) 
(discussing the success of the Acid Rain Program). During climate change 
negotiations, in the words of one commentator, the United States “rammed a 
global cap-and-trade model into the Kyoto Protocol.” Grubb, supra note 18, at 
666. It appears that the success of the Acid Rain Program in cost effectively 
reducing emissions provided motivation for U.S. cap-and-trade proposals 
during Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, Time to 
Ditch Kyoto, 449 NATURE 973, 973 (2007) (suggesting that the design of the 
Kyoto Protocol was influenced by successful regulation of acid rain, ozone 
depletion, and nuclear proliferation in the 1980s). 
 21. E.g., Scott Barrett, Montreal Versus Kyoto: International Cooperation 
and the Global Environment, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 192, 192–219 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) 
(discussing the differing economic calculations affecting ozone and climate 
change negotiations); Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (observing that the 
UNFCCC regime approach to climate change was “inspired by” the Montreal 
Protocol, but noting that “[c]limate change does not fit the parameters of the 
ozone problem”). 
 22. See, e.g., Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (“The Montreal Protocol 
was highly successful, as economically viable alternatives were available for 
removing ozone-depleting gases from a limited number of products and 
production processes.”); McAllister, supra note 20, at 4–8 (summarizing the 
reasons for the success of the Acid Rain Program, including highly effective 
emissions monitoring and enforcement policies). 
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these characteristics.23 Instead, attempts to impose 
quantifiable GHG emissions reduction targets raised deep 
equity issues between developed and developing countries,24 
while also posing a challenge that implicated the prospect of 
requiring major changes across a wide range of economic 
sectors (such as energy and transportation) without any clear 
technological means of accomplishing them.25 
The 2009 UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen marked a 
decisive end of the collective illusion that a top-down, legalistic 
model of the Kyoto Protocol could provide the authority 
envisioned by “tragedy of the commons” metaphors.26 Since 
then, scholars and policymakers have searched for alternative 
means of addressing climate change by searching for lessons in 
the failures of the UNFCCC process and by seeking alternative 
approaches.27 
A. ENERGY POLICY AS A CONTEXT FOR CLIMATE POLICY 
One lesson from the failed UNFCCC efforts, which drives 
much of the current interest in melding environmental and 
energy law, is that context matters. As Elinor Ostrom noted, 
“[t]here are no panaceas . . . for complex problems such as 
global warming.”28 The Montreal Protocol worked in the 
context of ozone depletion and the Acid Rain Program worked 
                                                          
 23. E.g., Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (“Climate change does not fit 
the parameters of the ozone problem. Thus far, there are no generally 
accepted solutions let alone implementation paths.”). 
 24. See id. at 6 (“Implementing these agreements will require an 
unprecedented level of cooperation . . . especially between the industrialized 
world and emerging market powers. These efforts will have to go far beyond 
the current stalemated negotiations between developed and developing 
states.”); see also David Tackacs, Forest Carbon Offsets and International Law: 
A Deep Equity Legal Analysis, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 521 (2010) 
(proposing a concept of “deep equity” that is similar to the meaning implied 
here). 
 25. See Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2, 5 (arguing that policies going 
forward will “alter fundamental structures of our economy,” while highlighting 
the notion that we currently have no generally accepted technological means 
in place to implement new climate change policies and that “new technologies 
and energy markets occasionally . . . lead to ‘backward’ fuel choices”). 
 26. See Dale Jamieson, Climate Change, Consequentialism, and the Road 
Ahead, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 439, 444, 448–54 (2013) (examining “The Dream of 
Rio” as a force-shaping climate policy and its end at the 2009 negotiations in 
Copenhagen). 
 27. See infra Parts I.A–D, III. 
 28. Ostrom, supra note 17, at 555. 
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in the context of the U.S. acid rain problem, but they did not 
create one-size-fits-all prescriptive models.29 Addressing 
climate change will require attention to the context in which 
the problem arose and the development of contextually 
appropriate strategies to change the behaviors causing the 
problem.30 
There are essentially two policy areas that constitute the 
contexts from which climate change arose: energy and land use 
(primarily deforestation).31 Each context raises its own unique 
issues, opportunities, and challenges. This Article’s scope 
examines energy, but there is one point worth noting about 
deforestation. Somewhat ironically, while deforestation 
received relatively little attention through the UNFCCC 
regime, it has been the area of greatest agreement in recent 
negotiations32 and produced an innovative REDD+33 program 
that some, including myself, have suggested may hold clues as 
to what more effective forms of climate regulation on a global 
scale might look like.34 In line with the argument below, this 
recent progress may be a result of the rather broad and flexible 
principles that have framed discussions addressing 
deforestation in the climate change regime, which have 
fostered a wide range of innovative governance experiments at 
multiple scales.35 Energy-based mitigation, by contrast, was 
                                                          
 29. See supra note 22. 
 30. See Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 1–2 (suggesting that pre-existing 
international efforts proceeded “without an agreed context” and suggesting 
that “energy policy has to be a starting point if we wish to mitigate climate 
change”). 
 31. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 458, 523–27 (looking at the recent 
emergence of deforestation as “a major focus of climate policy” and the impact 
of deforestation on global carbon emissions); Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 4 
(discussing the difficulties in energy regulation due to the “current structure 
of the energy sector” and global reliance on fossil fuels). 
 32. Boyd, supra note 14, at 458 (“[D]eforestation . . . has only recently 
become a major focus of climate policy, emerging as one of the few areas of 
consensus in the international climate negotiations.”). 
 33. REDD refers to reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation. 
 34. E.g., Boyd, supra note 14, at 471–73; Andrew Long, Global Climate 
Governance to Enhance Biodiversity & Well-Being: Integrating Non-State 
Networks and Public International Law in Tropical Forests, 41 ENVTL. L. 95, 
163 (2011) (“Thus, the convergent legal mechanism suggested here for REDD 
could be developed into a novel approach to multiple areas of global 
environmental governance.”). 
 35. E.g., Boyd, supra note 14, at 549–50. 
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the subject of the most intensive, rigid, and detailed legal and 
institutional development of the UNFCCC.36 Stepping back 
from the narrow focus of the UNFCCC, however, we can see 
that the primary features of the energy context that are 
directly relevant to climate change are fossil fuel dominance 
and the global scale of energy-related forces (including market 
forces) that shape the policy arena.37 Indeed, fossil fuel 
dominance of the energy sector is the single most important 
reason for climate change risks.38 
B. CLIMATE CHANGE: ENVIRONMENTAL HARM FROM AN ENERGY 
PROBLEM 
Climate change remains a major threat to humanity 
primarily because GHG emissions are increasing,39 while a 
robust scientific consensus has developed around the need for 
dramatic decreases over the near-term in order to stabilize the 
climate system.40 It would be hard to overstate the severity of 
the problem. Global energy demand is rising dramatically and, 
even assuming rapid development of renewables, the present 
energy policy structure would meet approximately seventy-five 
                                                          
 36. E.g., Schipper, supra note 13, at 82–83. 
 37. E.g., Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 5 (“Given the dominance of fossil 
fuels, the implementation of bold climate measures will cause severe financial 
and economic disruptions, as fossil-fuel based facilities worth hundreds of 
billions would become ‘stranded assets’ and the use of renewables involves 
much higher costs. Thus, government policies towards the energy sector have 
great impact on the future global energy landscape and international climate 
governance.”). 
 38. Cf. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1. 
 39. E.g., Howard Bamsey & John Christensen, Foreword to UNEP RISØ 
CENTRE, ELEMENTS OF A NEW CLIMATE AGREEMENT BY 2015, at 4, 4 (Karen 
Holm Olsen et al. eds., 2013) (finding that a comparison of UNEP’s 2011 and 
2012 reports “indicate[ ] that global emissions are increasing”). 
 40. A number of recent studies analyze the extent of emissions reductions 
needed to stabilize the climate system at a level of global average temperature 
rise consistent with the two degrees Celsius goal established by UNFCCC 
negotiations. See, e.g., Michel G.J. den Elzen et al., Analysing the Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Reductions of the Mitigation Action Plans by Non-Annex I 
Countries by 2020, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 633, 633 (2013) (concluding that, in order 
to stabilize the climate at two degrees Celsius above the baseline, developed 
countries would need to reduce emissions by fifty percent below 1990 levels by 
2020 if developing countries meet their current pledges); see also Bamsey & 
Christensen, supra note 39, at 4 (providing several analyses of “crucial 
aspects” required to meet stabilization goals). 
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to eighty percent of the demand with fossil fuels.41 The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that even with a 
significant shift away from coal and oil, anticipated emissions 
through 2035 correspond with a long-term global average 
temperature rise of 3.6 degrees Celsius.42 The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
others predict major impacts on human health and natural 
systems at that level of temperature change.43 For example, 
that degree of climate change is likely to cause many terrestrial 
ecosystems, such as the Amazon Rainforest, to undergo 
dramatic transformation, if not collapse.44 Such transformation 
will not only rapidly accelerate biodiversity loss and undermine 
human well-being in the region, but also have implications for 
hydrological cycles while transforming terrestrial ecosystems 
into a net source of GHGs as they undergo fundamental 
transformations, thus further accelerating climate change.45 In 
                                                          
 41. DRIES LESAGE ET AL., GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE IN A 
MULTIPOLAR WORLD 2 (2010) (“[E]nergy demand is set to rise spectacularly in 
the coming decades, especially in the emerging and developing world. Without 
policy adjustments, global energy demand will increase by over 50 percent by 
2030, and up to 80 percent of this demand will be met by fossil fuels.” (citation 
omitted)); see also IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that fossil fuels 
currently represent eighty-one percent of the global energy market, and will 
only drop to a seventy-five percent share by 2035). 
 42. Cf. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (anticipating natural gas to 
nearly overtake coal as an energy source by 2035, by which time rise in 
energy-related CO2 emissions will have led to a long-term average 
temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Celsius). 
 43. For example, the IPCC estimates a loss of approximately thirty 
percent of coastal wetlands, significant disruption of food production, and the 
net transformation of ecosystems from carbon sinks to carbon sources at 
temperature increases of more than three degrees Celsius. M.L. PARRY ET AL., 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 11–12, 16 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf. 
 44. Chris Jones et al., Committed Terrestrial Ecosystem Changes Due to 
Climate Change, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 484, 485 (2009), available at 
http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/v2/n7/pdf/ngeo555.pdf (“There seems to be 
a temperature below which the equilibrium state of the [Amazon] forest is 
approximately constant, but above which the equilibrium forest cover declines 
steadily with changing climate. This point could be seen as a threshold beyond 
which some degree of loss of Amazon forest is inevitable.”). 
 45. See id. at 484–86 (using modeling to demonstrate committed 
ecosystem damage in the Amazon that would result from increasing global 
temperatures); see also PARRY ET AL., supra note 43, at 11–16 (discussing the 
impacts of climate change on ecosystems and human health). Recent droughts 
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short, projections of the energy system over the coming decades 
suggest that GHG emissions will continue at such a level that 
climatic changes will dramatically increase human suffering in 
some parts of the world,46 cause significant and disruptive 
impacts on natural systems (many of which are largely 
unpredictable),47 and impose significant economic stress on 
even the world’s most robust economies.48 
Although climate change may be most familiar to us as an 
environmental problem, this does not necessarily mean that it 
will be most effectively regulated through environmental law 
techniques. Climate change is part ecological concern, 
particularly through its natural processes and impacts, and 
part economic concern, particularly through its causes in the 
energy sector.49 Thus, there are at least two ways to approach 
regulation—one focused on the ecology of climate change and 
one focused on the economy of climate change. The former 
suggests an approach derived from working backwards from a 
desired result in natural systems;50 the latter suggests an 
                                                          
in the Amazon region are affecting a significant portion of the forest, which 
may suggest that climate change is already impacting the ecosystem. E.g., 
Jonathan Watts, Amazon Showing Signs of Degradation Due to Climate 
Change, NASA Warns, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2013, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/18/amazon-rainforest-
climate-change-nasa. 
 46. See PARRY ET AL., supra note 43, at 13 (“Agricultural production, 
including access to food, in many African countries and regions is projected to 
be severely compromised by climate variability and change.”). 
 47. See id. at 8–11 (highlighting the impacts of climate change on 
ecosystems and natural systems). 
 48. Lesage et al. suggest possible global depression given the importance 
of fossil fuels in the world economy, for example, and note that Stern has 
suggested climate change could impose economic costs equivalent to a five to 
twenty percent reduction of consumption per person, LESAGE ET AL., supra 
note 41, at 2, which is not to say it would be evenly distributed, of course. 
 49. See generally MALTE FABER & REINER MANSTETTEN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
BASICS OF ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY 16–24 (Dale Adams trans., 2010) 
(providing that the disciplines of ecology and economics “lay the foundation for 
environmental education”). 
 50. See MICHAEL COMMON & SIGRID STAGL, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 506–10 (2005) (analyzing a potential, yet unrealistic, ecological 
approach to climate change in the context of setting mitigation targets and 
working backwards from the mitigation targets to determine how to effectively 
achieve them). 
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approach based on the human systems that have caused the 
disturbances in the natural systems.51 
The two words, “ecology” and “economy,” suggest the 
differences in ecological and economic approaches to climate 
change mitigation. Their common root “eco,” which derives 
from the Greek word oikos (“house”), reflects that both involve 
a form of “house-keeping.”52 The suffixes of “ecology” and 
“economy” reveal their differences. “Ecology” includes a suffix 
derived from the Greek word logos (“study”) and thus reflects a 
“house-keeping” based on studying the entire planet, the 
relationships of all organisms and processes that make up our 
“home,” the Earth.53 “Economy,” on the other hand, includes a 
suffix derived from the Greek word nomos (“order”) and thus 
reflects a “house-keeping” of order created by humanity, the 
management of human organization and interaction, rather 
than a pre-existing natural system.54 
Although overlapping and interdependent, ecological and 
economic approaches to climate change mitigation can be 
distinguished by the number of actors involved. Ecological 
systems involve a myriad of living and non-living types of 
actors or forces, while humans alone are the primary actors in 
economic systems.55 Thus, an ecological approach will operate 
from a broad consideration of all relevant processes and 
components, such as the environmental law approach focused 
                                                          
 51. See id. at 1–3, 12 (“The global scale of human economic activity is now 
such that the levels of its extractions from and insertions into the 
environment do affect the way that it works.”). 
 52. For this and related points, I am indebted to Jim Chen’s feedback on 
an earlier draft of this article. Jim discusses “house-keeping” in Jim Chen, 
Biolaw: Cracking the Code, 56 KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1031–32 (2008); see also, 
e.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 16 (“The special significance of 
ecology and economics is revealed as soon as we take a closer look at the two 
terms themselves: ‘ecology’ and ‘economy’. Both share the component ‘eco’ 
which is derived from the ancient Greek word ‘oikos’, meaning ‘house’. Oikos 
does not only mean the building itself, however, but refers to everything that 
can be better summarised [sic] under the term ‘household’.”). 
 53. E.g., COMMON & STAGL, supra note 50, at 1 (“Ecology is the study of 
nature’s housekeeping . . . .”); FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 18–20. 
 54. E.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 16–18; see also 
COMMON & STAGL, supra note 50, at 1 (“[E]conomics is the study of 
housekeeping in human societies.”). 
 55. COMMON & STAGL, supra note 50, at 1. 
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on harm prevention.56 An “economic” approach in this sense, 
however, will focus more directly on the human-created order 
that gives rise to the climate change problem and, thus, 
establish goals that seek to adjust the inputs and ordering of 
human relations more than achieving a pre-defined outcome.57 
Although either approach might be equally effective if fully 
implemented, the difference in orientation may have profound 
effects on the likelihood that either approach will be adopted 
and effectively implemented. The UNFCCC experience 
illustrates the challenge of employing an ecological approach to 
regulation of complex global environmental problems—it often 
seems as though the actors in climate debates spend more time 
identifying processes and the goals of regulation than on 
developing effective mechanisms to change the human behavior 
causing the problem.58 
An “economic” approach, as that term is used here (which 
is explicitly not an endorsement of relying on markets), may be 
more successful simply because it focuses almost exclusively on 
human behavior, which (unlike ecosystem behavior) can be 
altered directly by adjusting rules, changing incentives, and 
employing other tools of regulation.59 Thus, while climate 
change can be approached from several regulatory angles, 
energy policy—concerned primarily with the economics of 
converting resources into forms of energy suitable for human 
use—may provide a more promising avenue than 
environmental law. 
While this initial argument for adopting an “economic” 
approach to climate change through a focus on the energy 
system relies on its relative simplicity, when compared with a 
more holistic ecological approach, the next Part will shatter 
any illusion that energy policy reform is a simple matter.60 
Although focusing primarily on energy policy may avoid many 
of the complications inherent in a broader focus on the impacts 
of climate change, energy policy itself poses a host of challenges 
to effective regulation, not the least of which is its complexity. 
                                                          
 56. E.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 19–20 (“Ecology is the 
science of the interactions of living creatures with one another and the abiotic 
conditions within their environments.”). 
 57. E.g., id. at 16–24. 
 58. See infra Part I.D.4. 
 59. E.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 20–23. 
 60. See infra Part I.D. 
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That, perhaps, is the strongest argument for focusing 
primarily, if not exclusively, on the “economic” order of energy 
policy in pursuing mitigation—once the goal of climate change 
mitigation has been accepted, there is no need to layer the 
complicating factors of environmental law approaches on top of 
the already complex challenge of energy system reform. 
C. GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY AS THE CONTEXT FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION 
If energy policy is understood as the appropriate context 
for addressing climate change, the next question is whether the 
appropriate scale of reform efforts is national or global.61 
Recent U.S. energy law and policy scholarship addressing 
climate change seems to focus on U.S. domestic policy.62 Unlike 
much of this recent literature, this Article identifies global 
energy policy as a context for climate governance.63 
Articulating a reason to target U.S. energy policy, Joseph 
Tomain suggests that “difficulties in bringing together all 
nations in an effort to craft a climate change response [means 
that] . . . . the prelude to the United States taking an 
international leadership role is that domestically, it must take 
seriously the need to put in place a low-carbon energy 
economy.”64 However, Tomain also suggests that “we must 
create future energy policy as a transformative moment, not 
simply as an incremental transition moving slowly away from 
                                                          
 61. Other scales are, of course, possible. A related question is the extent to 
which reform should focus on encouraging individual behavior changes or to 
concentrate primarily on changing energy sources and other systemic factors. 
Compare Daniel A. Farber, Sustainable Consumption, Energy Policy, and 
Individual Well-Being, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1523 (2012) (“[P]olicymakers 
should give people the basis for making more informed, sustainable 
consumption decisions, both about their direct energy use and about goods 
such as water and food that require energy expenditures.”), with Wildermuth, 
supra note 4, at 384 (describing individual voluntary actions as “far too little 
and far too late,” and noting the relative difficulties of using this approach to 
bring about significant change in emissions). 
 62. I have not systematically compared the volume of literature on 
international and domestic policy, but research for this Article and related 
projects suggests that U.S. environmental law scholars give significantly more 
attention to domestic energy policy than to its larger-scale counterparts. 
 63. See supra note 9. 
 64. TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232. 
1070 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
fossil fuels to new resources.”65 Although one can debate 
whether a transformational moment is strictly necessary, rapid 
transformation of energy practices would clearly provide 
greater climate benefits than a slower, linear process of 
incremental change.66 In my opinion, the urgency of climate 
threats offers at least a preliminary reason to focus primarily 
on developing responses to climate change at the global, rather 
than national, scale. Attempting to improve U.S. energy policy 
as a prelude to international negotiations is, itself, an 
incremental approach in which each of the steps could take 
decades to complete—decades during which developing country 
emissions, in particular, are nearly certain to rise rapidly.67 
Changes to global energy policy, on the other hand, have at 
least the potential to reach a far larger share of total emissions 
than any single nation’s policy and offers the option of 
targeting the massive growth in developing country emissions 
as an avenue for relatively rapid action (and relatively cost-
effective) on emissions.68 Thus, the potential for truly 
transformational change appears greater at the global scale. 
The unwieldiness of international politics and the 
challenges of international law-making (as suggested by 
Tomain) likely explain why some scholars focus on domestic 
                                                          
 65. Id. at 234. A variety of views on this point are expressed in the 
literature. See Davies, supra note 4, at 506 (“Change, especially big change, 
takes time.”); Farber, supra note 61, at 1523 (“Change will be slow, but 
practical first steps do exist.”); Outka, supra note 4, at 1681 (“This Article is 
concerned with renewable energy’s too-slow transition and with how existing 
legal regimes work to preserve fossil energy dominance.”). Nonetheless, there 
is no serious debate over whether a transformation is necessary to address 
climate change or that delay increases the risks posed by climate change. See 
supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 66. E.g., Outka, supra note 4, at 1680–83. 
 67. See TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232 (previewing the steps that the 
United States must put in place to improve domestic energy policy); see also 
Elzen et al., supra note 40, at 633 (“There are upward revisions of greenhouse 
gas emission projections in many developing countries.”). 
 68. The projected growth in energy demand in developing countries is 
clearly justifiable to the extent it meets important social objectives associated 
with energy policy, such as relieving energy poverty. See Ann Florini & 
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Bridging the Gaps in Global Energy Governance, 17 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 57, 66 (2011) (“Improved access to energy services is 
arguably the key defining characteristic of economic development.”). Where 
basic access to electricity is the motivation for capacity additions, financing to 
support renewable technologies is likely to have a particularly direct effect in 
lowering emissions. See id. at 66–67. 
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policy despite the glaring need for global reform.69 While it is 
true that global policies have the potential to affect emissions 
throughout the world, there seems to be a greater certainty 
that efforts will have at least some effect in domestic law—it is 
more predictable, and actors are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States, unlike the traditional actors in international 
law (sovereign states who can only be bound by their own 
consent).70 International political actors now clearly include 
corporations, civil society organizations, and others who 
undoubtedly complicate the field,71 which may seem to make 
global energy policy a particularly unappealing space for legal 
scholars used to working in areas where lines of authority and 
jurisdiction are, if not clear, at least comprehensible. The 
unpredictability of the global political environment may seem 
to make global policy reform as a strategy for climate change 
regulation a riskier bet and, thus, one might prefer the small 
but relatively certain progress that can be achieved with 
domestic law reform.72 
However, this apparent argument for seeking 
predictability in a smaller-scale context should be turned on its 
head. The very complicated and, more importantly, complex 
context of governing at the global scale offers a key reason for 
scholars, and ultimately policymakers, to focus their energies 
on developing approaches that draw upon the interactions that 
characterize complex social and economic systems to unleash, 
or perhaps just nudge, the forces that drive complex systems 
toward inventing new pathways. These new pathways could be 
capable of re-orienting the energy system onto a trajectory that 
produces a low-carbon energy system far more rapidly than is 
conceivable through incremental, domestic-first strategies or 
the pre-existing track of UNFCCC negotiations.73 
Maintaining a global focus in light of UNFCCC failures, 
rather than retreating to familiar domestic law and policy 
challenges with far less potential impact, forces us to change 
                                                          
 69. See infra Part I.D.4; see also TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232 
(“Copenhagen 2009, however, demonstrated the difficulties in bringing 
together all nations in an effort to craft a climate change response.”). 
 70. See TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 234–35 (providing a number of principle 
and policy suggestions for domestic energy policy). 
 71. See infra Part I.D.4. 
 72. E.g., TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232, 234–35. 
 73. See infra Parts II, III. 
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the way we think of the mitigation challenge and may thereby 
reveal opportunities that are not available by adding up a 
collection of component domestic environmental efforts.74 
Climate change is a global phenomenon. This fact does not 
undercut the need for attention to smaller scales, but it does 
suggest that we should develop a multiscalar strategy that 
includes a well-crafted global element (rather than a vague 
hope for more effective negotiations if the United States 
gradually reduces its emissions) capable of spurring the types 
of interactions among reform efforts at all scales to produce the 
necessary transformative global change as quickly as possible. 
Examining energy policy on the global scale has the advantage 
of allowing us to consider that interaction of components within 
the undeniably global system that causes climate change, thus 
calling attention to an array of possibilities for reinventing 
global climate governance that cannot be seen when one 
focuses on the domestic level. Before elaborating on the ways in 
which focusing on the global energy system affects analysis of 
mitigation strategy in Parts II through IV, it is useful to briefly 
survey the terrain of global energy policy to elucidate some of 
its components. 
D. CHALLENGES AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE ENERGY POLICY 
ARENA 
Any hope to stabilize the climate system in the next few 
decades without resorting to geoengineering will be a rapid 
shift away from fossil-fuel dependent technologies on a large 
scale.75 The technological and economic challenges of achieving 
this shift are enormous.76 For example, the IEA reports that 
                                                          
 74. This has begun to happen in the context of forestry-related GHG 
emissions. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 470–73 (discussing REDD+ as perhaps 
the best example of the type of “assemblages” needed to address global 
environmental problems, such as saving the tropical rainforests); Long, supra 
note 34, at 162–64 (discussing the potential for REDD+ to stimulate more 
holistic environmental protection mechanisms). Relatively little literature 
discusses reconceptualizing the energy mitigation challenge, however. For an 
example, see David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty 
Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 109–16 (2009) (discussing the 
framing of climate-energy problems). 
 75. See Felder, supra note 9, at 95–97 (stating that stabilization of GHG 
emissions in the next few decades would require “a complete overhaul of the 
existing and proposed [global energy system]”). 
 76. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two 
Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2007) (stating that perceptions of 
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the additional electricity capacity required by 2035 is larger 
than the entire installed capacity of the world in 2011.77 Much 
of this added capacity is predicted to be fossil fuel dependent, 
even with current and reasonably likely future renewable 
energy promotion policies taken into account.78 
Moreover, many aspects of the existing energy system are 
socially reinforced through current legal, political, and 
institutional arrangements.79 Thus, the absence of scalable and 
reliable alternatives to fossil fuels, in the context of rising 
demand for energy, combines with these factors to create a 
global energy system in which fossil fuels are becoming more 
deeply entrenched as the dominant energy source over exactly 
the period in which rapid decrease of GHG emissions is 
needed.80 
The remainder of this Part highlights several of the most 
prominent aspects of the global energy policy arena that pose 
obstacles to significant reform. Perhaps the most prominent 
                                                          
the high costs of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, and of relatively low 
benefit, provide “the central explanation” for why that agreement was less 
successful than the Montreal Protocol); see also Barrett, supra note 21, at 200–
16 (advancing a similar argument and providing detailed discussion of specific 
projections); Benjamin K. Sovacool, Rejecting Renewables: The Socio-technical 
Impediments to Renewable Electricity in the United States, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 
4500, 4503 (2009) (explaining that implementing renewable power 
technologies challenge the existing energy system, and that the “process of 
creating and adopting technologies is complex, interactive, and political”). 
 77. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that this would include 
necessary replacement of existing capacity due to age). 
 78. Id. (expecting renewables to represent only half of the capacity 
additions). 
 79. See, e.g., Rosemary Lyster, Renewable Energy in the Context of 
Climate Change and Global Energy Resources 1 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 13/61, Aug. 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2315911 (listing a number 
of significant barriers to the development of “renewable energy technologies”); 
Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 4, at 780–807 (examining the impact of 
physical, market, and regulatory forces on the U.S. energy system); Sovacool, 
supra note 76, at 4501 (demonstrating that the “impediments to renewable 
power” are “socio-technical,” encompassing “technological, social, political, 
regulatory, and cultural aspects”). 
 80. See Felder, supra note 9, at 105 (“The GES is a large-scale system in 
which no single, carbon-free, or scalable technology exists that would stabilize 
greenhouse gas emissions in the relatively near future. It is an interconnected 
and open system, providing vital services in and of itself, but also to other 
complex systems such as transportation, communication, water, and 
security.”); Lyster, supra note 79, at 17–18 (stating that fossil fuels are likely 
to remain dominant). 
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consideration in energy policy is economics.81 As a primarily 
economic activity, one can argue that energy production is 
driven largely by the market. However, as discussed below, the 
energy market is severely distorted by subsidies, illustrating 
that fossil fuel dominance is not purely an economic matter.82 
Other considerations, including the very diffuse nature of 
authority exercised over energy decisions at the international 
level, complicate efforts to reform international energy policy.83 
Thus, after briefly touching on economic considerations that 
inhere to support the status quo, this Article highlights the roll 
that energy plays at the nexus of several other social and 
environmental issues, emphasizes the importance of energy in 
geopolitical power distribution, and describes the existing 
international energy governance structure, before subsequent 
Parts explore how these illustrative elements of global energy 
policy support conceptualizing climate change as an emergent 
problem of the global energy system. 
1. Economics and Energy Policy 
As is widely recognized, economic considerations maintain 
fossil fuel dominance in significant ways. Most obviously, many 
investments in energy generation are sunk costs that cannot be 
transferred or reinvested into another product or process.84 For 
example, construction of an electricity generating facility 
entails large up-front costs and relatively low operating costs.85 
Accordingly, basic economic analysis encourages owners to 
operate the facility until the costs of maintenance justify 
constructing a new facility, effectively entrenching fossil fuel 
generation at the facility for decades.86 However, isolating the 
role of economic considerations in this way risks providing a 
false picture of energy system dynamics. 
                                                          
 81. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 82. See Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68, at 64 (explaining that long-
established subsidies that benefit fossil fuels and nuclear energy pervert the 
market and discourage the pursuit of alternative energy). 
 83. See infra Part II.D.4. 
 84. Felder, supra note 9, at 99 (“Much, if not all, of the initial investment 
in energy assets are sunk, that is, irreversible.”); Sovacool, supra note 76, at 
4504–06. 
 85. Felder, supra note 9, at 99–100. 
 86. See id. at 100–01. 
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Economic considerations favoring fossil fuel technologies 
are reinforced (perhaps even constructed) politically, most 
directly through fossil fuel subsidies that have proven 
exceptionally difficult to change.87 Collectively, states provide 
as much as $700 billion in one year to economically support 
fossil fuel production and consumption.88 These subsidies 
distort the market and affect the global political economy of 
energy.89 The contrast between fossil fuel subsidies and 
renewable energy subsidies is stark: IEA estimates that 2011 
combined global subsides for all renewable energy sources 
amounted to $88 billion, while fossil fuel subsidies were six 
times higher at $523 billion.90 Despite repeated pledges by 
some of the world’s most powerful nations to begin reducing 
fossil fuel subsidies, and even some modest action on those 
pledges, the overall level of fossil fuel subsidies rose thirty 
percent from 2010 to 2011.91 
                                                          
 87. See Lyster, supra note 79, at 17–18 (stating that reforming fossil fuel 
subsidies would significantly reduce GHG emissions, but that because of the 
inbuilt subsidies to fossil fuels and “the failure to fully internalize the climate 
and non-climate externalities,” fossil fuels are likely to continue being our 
primary energy source). 
 88. The figure of $700 billion is an estimate of total fossil fuel subsidies in 
2009 reported in the IEA, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World 
Bank Joint Report. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF 
ENERGY SUBSIDIES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE G-20 INITIATIVE 4 (2010) 
[hereinafter G-20 JOINT REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.org/
env/45575666.pdf. The Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI), an international civil 
society organization, estimates $600 billion in fossil fuel subsidies, including 
$100 billion in producer subsidies during the same year. Fossil Fuels - At 
What Cost?, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE, http://www.iisd.org/gsi/fossil-fuel-
subsidies/fossil-fuels-what-cost (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). However, GSI also 
notes that the actual value of subsidies is impossible to determine because 
there is no international monitoring framework in place. Id. In any event, the 
annual amount of fossil fuel subsidies fluctuates widely based on energy 
prices, economic activity levels, and other factors. G-20 JOINT REPORT, supra, 
at 4, 15. 
 89. See Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68, at 64 (“These subsidies distort 
the price signals that consumers receive . . . and artificially create demand for 
both energy and its associated infrastructure.”); Lyster, supra note 79, at 12–
13 (discussing various fossil fuel subsidies that make it difficult for renewable 
sources to compete “in terms of price”). 
 90. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, at 49, 66 
(2012); Lyster, supra note 79, at 3–5 (discussing the IEA WORLD ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2012). 
 91. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (“Subsidies to fossil fuels continue 
to distort energy markets and expanded considerably last year despite 
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Moreover, changing subsidy policies is not simply a matter 
of reforming developed countries’ support for multinational 
energy corporations. In some countries, consumer subsidies—
subsidies that effectively reduce the price of fossil fuels for the 
end consumer—are employed by national regimes to maintain 
popularity or diffuse public resistance to their rule.92 Countries 
such as Russia, China, and Iran pour significant percentages of 
their GDP (worth billions of U.S. dollars) into subsidizing fossil 
fuels.93 These subsidies have created political situations in 
which change can provoke volatile responses.94 In Nigeria, for 
example, a decision to rapidly end fossil fuel subsidies resulted 
in rioting in the streets and a hasty reinstatement of the 
repealed policies.95 
2. Social and Environmental Issues in Energy Policy 
Global energy policy is also a node of connection many of 
the major global social and environmental issues that are likely 
to define the twenty-first century.96 The social and 
environmental impacts of globally relevant economic variations 
in the energy system can be very large, as evidenced by the 
effects of oil price fluctuation on economies throughout the 
                                                          
international efforts at reform.”); INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 90, at 71 
(“G-20 and [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] member economies have made 
commitments in recent years to phase out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies.”). 
 92. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 90, at 70 (explaining that due 
to fossil fuel subsidies, consumers “paid only 76% of the reference or 
unsubsidized price,” and that subsidies thus “reduce end-user prices below 
those that would prevail in an open and competitive market”). 
 93. The economic value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies for Iran 
exceeded $80 billion in 2011, while Russia’s was close to $40 billion and 
China’s exceeded $30 billion. Id. at 71. 
 94. James Kanter, Cost of Subsidizing Fossil Fuels Is High, But Cutting 
Them Is Tough, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
10/24/business/global/cost-of-subsidizing-fossil-fuels-is-high-but-cutting-them-
is-tough.html (“These subsidies are fiendishly difficult to dismantle because of 
the political risks involved.”). 
 95. Monica Mark, Nigeria Reels After Oil Subsidy Row Turns into 
Country’s Biggest Ever Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2012, 1:38 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/18/nigeria-power-struggle-
protest-oil; see also Kanter, supra note 94 (citing an example from Bolivia). 
 96. As Florini and Sovacool explain, energy issues “form a common thread 
across many of the most pressing global problems, cutting across geopolitical, 
environmental, and economic dimensions.” Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68, 
at 57. 
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world.97 Social impacts emerging from the current state of the 
energy system penetrate deeply in locally and globally 
significant ways.98 Although climate change may well be the 
most important long-term social and environmental challenge 
of energy policy, there are a host of other major social and 
environmental concerns to confront, such as widespread health 
impacts from air pollution (especially in developing 
countries),99 severe economic impacts resulting from dwindling 
supply and rising demand,100 human rights abuse and other 
socially damaging action by non-democratic national 
governments enriched by fossil fuel resources (primarily oil),101 
questions regarding the stability and sustainability of 
agricultural production methods,102 water contamination and 
overuse affecting human populations and natural systems 
                                                          
 97. Felder, supra note 9, at 95–96. 
 98. See, e.g., Andreas Goldthau & Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Uniqueness 
of the Energy Security, Justice, and Governance Problem, 41 ENERGY POL’Y 
232, 238 (2012) (arguing that energy transitions are “susceptible to transform 
the cultural and social fundamentals of entire nations”). 
 99. Even with the UNFCCC controls in place at the time, the U.S. 
National Research Council estimated $62 billion in non-climate damages from 
coal in 2005, which equates to $66/ton. Lyster, supra note 79, at 16. Damages 
are significantly higher (proportionally) in developing countries where 
pollution controls are significantly weaker or non-existent. See INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, supra note 90, at 319–20 (discussing health problems caused by air 
pollution, and comparing air pollution levels of OECD and non-OECD 
countries). 
 100. Global energy demand is expected to increase by over one-third by 
2035, with much of the increase attributable to non-OECD countries (such as 
China, India, and the Middle East). See IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1. 
Additionally, an investment of $37 trillion in our energy supply system would 
be necessary to meet increasing energy demands. Id. 
 101. Journalist and commentator Tom Friedman refers to the anti-
democratic influence of oil economics in Middle Eastern countries as “the First 
Law of Petropolitics.” THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY 
WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION—AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 112–13 
(2008) (“As the price of oil goes up, the pace of freedom goes down; and as the 
price of oil goes down, the pace of freedom goes up.”); see also Goldthau & 
Sovacool, supra note 98, at 233 (“The world’s known oil reserves are 
concentrated in a handful of largely volatile countries . . . whose governments 
have been known to yield to the temptation to use their control of this vital 
resource for political ends.”). 
 102. E.g., Jeremy Woods et al., Energy and the Food System, 365 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2991, 3003–05 (2010) 
(highlighting the potential negative impacts of energy prices on agricultural 
outputs in discussing the relationship of fossil fuel markets, climate change, 
and agricultural processes). 
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already suffering from inadequate water supply,103 and the 
energy poverty associated with the 1.6 billion people who lack 
even basic access to electricity.104 These issue linkages 
highlight that energy policy does not operate in a vacuum in 
which only the carbon emissions are important. Existing 
energy policy has major negative externalities throughout the 
globe. At a minimum, they must be considered in energy policy 
reform. The potential to improve local, national, or regional 
conditions as part of an energy reform effort may also provide 
helpful political and economic incentives for efforts to reduce or 
replace fossil fuel dependence in a given geographic area or 
economic and policy sector. 
3. Energy and Geopolitical Power 
While social and environmental externalities of the energy 
status quo might provide leverage for reform, the potential for 
energy reform to implicate for states’ core security and power 
concerns may prove to be one of the toughest challenges facing 
efforts to restructure global energy policy.105 As one scholar 
describes it, “energy governance represents a contested domain 
between power-based geopolitical concerns and multilateral 
and cooperative governance.”106 Geopolitical policy analyst and 
scholar Joseph Nye describes oil as “the most important raw 
material in the world”107 and highlights the complex set of 
forces from which the existing geopolitical situation emerged, 
including the independence of former colonies, the Iranian 
Revolution, an inadvertent transfer of technology from 
                                                          
 103. See, e.g., IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 6 (predicting that energy 
use in the future will see a rise in water consumption by eighty-five percent); 
PARRY ET AL., supra note 43, at 11–16 (discussing the implications climate 
change will have on freshwater resources, how they are managed, and how 
various parts of the world will be affected). 
 104. LESAGE ET AL., supra note 41, at 2. 
 105. Kirsten Westphal, Energy Policy Between Multilateral Governance 
and Geopolitics: Whither Europe?, INTERNATIONALE POLITIK & 
GESELLSCHAFT, no. 4, 2006 at 44, 52 (stating that energy security and the 
energy sector as a whole remain vital for both a country’s national economy 
and security). 
 106. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Ann Florini, Examining the Complications of 
Global Energy Governance, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 235, 256 
(2012) (citing Westphal, supra note 105, at 45). 
 107. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER 64 (2011). 
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multinational corporations to oil-rich developing countries,108 
and an implicit security-for-oil relationship between the world’s 
most oil-rich nation and the world’s strongest military power.109 
Thus, “oil is the exception, not the rule” when it comes to the 
role of natural resources in global power relationships because 
control of oil and its distribution have literally shaped key 
global power relationships, rather than being determined by 
pre-existing political power relationships.110 Reducing oil’s 
dominance, therefore, would have massive geopolitical 
implications—and potentially impose massive economic losses 
on particular countries—with global power ramifications far 
beyond anything yet precipitated by existing environmental 
law. 
4. International Energy Governance Challenges 
The existing global energy governance structure is highly 
decentralized and, at least arguably, incoherent.111 Unlike 
environmental law, which is crowded with highly 
institutionalized regimes confronting an array of global 
environmental challenges,112 there is arguably no global energy 
governance institution with the capacity to exercise global 
                                                          
 108. The technology transfer referred to is of the type that Driesen and 
Popp describe as “meaningful technology transfer,” in that it involved 
enhancing the capacity and know-how of local economies within the countries 
where multinational corporations operated. See David M. Driesen & David 
Popp, Meaningful Technology Transfer for Climate Disruption, 64 J. INT’L AFF. 
1, 5–8 (2010) (defining technology transfers and meaningful technology 
transfers). The effect of this particular transfer was to shift political control of 
oil in a way that was unrelated to GHG mitigation goals, but it may be that a 
similar transfer of clean energy technology is required to realize climate 
change mitigation goals. See NYE, supra note 107, at 65–66 (describing the 
inadvertent technology transfer that occurred in oil-rich developing countries). 
 109. NYE, supra note 107, at 64–70. As Nye describes it, a system that was 
once ruled by the “seven sisters”—an oligarchy of seven large transnational 
corporations—is now governed by a delicate political balance centering on 
Saudi Arabia, the United States, and several lesser players. Id. at 64–66. 
 110. Id. at 64. 
 111. Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252 (positing that energy 
governance “incoherence is . . . amplified at the international level, where 
authority is fragmented and often altogether lacking”). 
 112. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 4, at 484, 486–90 (examining the present 
state of environmental law and the variety of challenges environmental law 
regimes address). 
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leadership authority on any subset of energy issues.113 Instead, 
there is an unwieldy assortment of institutions (one recent non-
exhaustive survey compiled fifty institutions that serve as 
“global energy governors”) with a wide array of mandates, 
geographic authority, and policy competencies.114 Thus, 
although global energy policy reaches the heart of many of the 
core challenges of the twenty-first century—security, 
development, and the environment—governance of the system 
has evolved primarily into a set of decentralized, mostly 
unconnected, and primarily political (as opposed to legal) 
institutions with limited impact.115 There are, in other words, 
no clear lines of authority in energy governance and no 
significant indications that an effective sector-wide governance 
system will develop. 
Some observers suggest that the governance institution 
that may offer the brightest hope for actually improving global 
energy policy is the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA), an institution with no binding authority and 
relatively small financial capacity that seeks primarily to 
promote renewable energy development through information-
based strategies and capacity building in least developed 
                                                          
 113. See LESAGE ET AL., supra note 41, at 72 (“As regards leadership in 
global energy governance, the world’s cockpit is still more or less empty.”); 
Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252 (discussing the incoherence and 
fragmentation of global energy governors and describing our current 
governance model as “full of sound and fury, yet . . . far too little substance”). 
 114. Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 239 tbl.2 (providing a table 
summarizing fifty “global energy governors”); see also Timothy Meyer, The 
Architecture of International Energy Governance, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
389, 390 (2012) (“An alphabet soup of international agreements and 
organizations deals in some way or another with international energy . . . .”). 
One can divide some of the major institutions in energy governance into 
producer versus consumer clubs, or into economic institutions and 
environmental institutions (primarily the UNFCCC), depending on how one 
looks at the field. Id. at 391. 
 115. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 14, at 57 (concluding that “the 
conventional framework is failing”); Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252 
(emphasizing the disconnect between global energy governance institutions). 
For example, a recent in-depth study of global energy governance explored 
whether the G8’s apparent assumption of leadership in energy governance is a 
sign that centralized energy governance is developing, but concluded that it 
fails to provide a viable model for improving global energy governance. E.g., 
LESAGE ET AL., supra note 41, at 172–73 (concluding that the “G8 has 
performed below expectations” and has displayed “serious shortcomings”). 
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countries.116 At a time when multilateral environmental 
regime-building efforts have slowed considerably, the creation 
and rapidly growing membership of IRENA stands out.117 
While it may signal a desire by some nations to counteract a 
perceived fossil fuel bias in the IEA—the primary pre-existing 
international energy institution—IRENA’s relative success in 
advancing its renewables-promotion mission also suggests the 
potential of non-legalistic (i.e., “soft” or non-binding) 
approaches to international environmental governance to 
influence behavior.118 Unlike the UNFCCC regime, IRENA’s 
efforts to promote renewable energy are intentionally not 
framed in terms of climate change or environmental benefit, 
even though such concerns motivate much of the growth in 
renewable energy technology that IRENA promotes.119 Thus, 
perhaps IRENA illuminates the potential for making progress 
on energy and climate challenges through adopting new 
approaches, and perhaps the value of its story relates to the 
need for rethinking existing perspectives on international 
climate change and energy policy. 
II. COMPLEXITY AND THE EMERGENCE                          
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The various features of energy policy briefly described 
above suggest the complex context of social, ecological, and 
technological interactions that efforts to catalyze energy sector 
changes must navigate if they are to produce climate change 
mitigation.120 In this policy environment, identifying 
interventions that will produce large-scale beneficial changes 
                                                          
 116. See Johannes Urpelainen & Thijs Van de Graaf, The International 
Renewable Energy Agency: A Success Story in Institutional Innovation?, INT’L 
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON., Sept. 2013, available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10784-013-9226-1. 
 117. IRENA was created months before the UNFCCC negotiations in 
Copenhagen signaled the apparent end of hope for a new binding climate 
agreement. In the next four years, over 100 countries ratified the agreement 
creating this new, stand-alone institution. Thijs Van de Graaf, Fragmentation 
in Global Energy Governance: Explaining the Creation of IRENA, 13 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 14, 14 (2013). 
 118. Urpelainen & Van de Graaf, supra note 116, at *10. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Cf. Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (“[C]limate measures must 
dovetail with energy policy and regulation of the energy sector if they are to 
have any effect.”). 
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requires strategies very different from the top-down UNFCCC 
process, a point illustrated by IRENA’s relatively successful 
start.121 Complex systems theory (or “complexity theory”) offers 
one way in which we might begin to understand the mitigation 
challenge differently and develop more effective policy 
interventions. 
In 1997, coincidentally the same year that the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed, J.B. Ruhl warned that “[u]nless 
environmental law sheds its traditional premises and methods, 
the findings of complexity theory suggest we will not achieve 
the kind of environmental law system needed to confront our 
changing future.”122 The recently developed concepts of the 
“anthropocene” and an Earth system in a “no analogue state” 
express an exceptional degree of human impact on the planet’s 
environmental systems123 that gives definition to the “changing 
future” referenced in Ruhl’s 1997 warning.124 Facing these 
                                                          
 121. See Urpelainen & Van de Graaf, supra note 116, at *12. 
 122. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941. 
 123. A number of scientists and others have come to highlight the 
unprecedented nature of human impacts on the earth’s environmental 
systems by describing the current era of time as the “Anthropocene.” 
Atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen (a Nobel laureate) and ecologist Eugene 
Stoermer coined the term in 2000. See Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, 
The “Anthropocene”, GLOBAL CHANGE NEWSL. (Int’l Geosphere-Biosphere 
Programme, Stockholm, Swed.), May 2000, at 17, 17–18, available at 
http://www.igbp.net/download/18.316f18321323470177580001401/1316517410
973/NL41.pdf. The globally-recognized organization that describes geological 
periods is The International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS). Although we 
are still officially in the Holocene, according to IUGS, the organization has 
begun a working group to consider the concept of the Anthropocene. 
Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy, Working Group on the 
‘Anthropocene’, INT’L COMMISSION ON STRATIGRAPHY, http://
quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/ (last updated Aug. 
1, 2013). The concept of a “no analogue” state expresses the idea that 
environmental systems have been so intensely impacted by human-caused 
forces that past empirical records are not reliably helpful to predicting 
outcomes. E.g., Arild Underdal, Complexity and Challenges of Long-Term 
Environmental Governance, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 386, 388 (2010). The 
“no analogue” concept has particular relevance in ecology and species 
conservation. E.g., Diana Stralberg et al., Re-shuffling of Species with Climate 
Disruption: A No-Analog Future for California Birds?, PLOS ONE, Sept. 2009, 
at 1, 5, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action;
jsessionid=E47834D0CCB2481E2BD368CCBCAAE227?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10
.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0006825&representation=PDF (“The likely emergence 
of novel, no-analog communities over the coming decades presents enormous 
conservation and management challenges.”). 
 124. See Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941. 
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complex problems requires evolution in the approaches of law 
and governance.125 
Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol and its failure to catalyze 
effective climate governance now seem to support Ruhl’s 
conclusion.126 The emphasis on a legalistic and top-down treaty 
structure to address climate change—the overarching goal of 
UNFCCC negotiations for nearly twenty years and expressed 
most clearly in the Kyoto Protocol and its quantifiable 
emissions reduction commitments127—reflected on the 
international level the core problem with domestic 
environmental law that led Ruhl to call for “a truly radical 
transformation of environmental law.”128 The core argument 
expressed by Ruhl and an increasing number of other 
environmental law scholars is that most of environmental law 
reflects a “reductionist, linear, predictivist mentality” and 
associated governance approach that fits poorly with the 
complex environmental systems that they regulate.129 Building 
                                                          
 125. E.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental 
Law: Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
771, 798 (2011) (suggesting that the complexity of environmental problems led 
to evolutionary changes in U.S. environmental regulation). 
 126. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 548–50 (discussing the Kyoto Protocol’s 
top-down, global approach, its failure to implement effective climate 
governance, and the need for a complex system to address climate change). 
 127. See id. at 548 (explaining that “the conviction that there can and 
should be a blueprint for comprehensive climate governance, manifest most 
prominently in the Kyoto architecture and in the efforts to negotiate a 
successor treaty” led to many of the disappointments and failures of the 
climate regime). 
 128. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941–42. Although most of his 
analysis focuses on domestic environmental law, Ruhl suggests that the 
transformation of environmental law should embrace an overall goal of global 
sustainable development, with decision-making processes based upon adaptive 
management principles, and the use of biodiversity preservation as a 
performance metric. Id. at 942. It is impossible to know what the international 
climate change regime would look like today if it had embraced Ruhl’s 
suggestions, of course, but the focus on a top-down treaty with quantifiable 
emissions reductions as the primary goal seems about as contrary to those 
suggestions as anything in U.S. domestic environmental law. 
 129. Id. at 940 (characterizing environmental law as “mired in a 
reductionist, linear, predictivist mentality”); see also Robin Kundis Craig, 
Learning to Think About Complex Environmental Systems in Environmental 
and Natural Resource Law and Legal Scholarship: A Twenty-Year 
Retrospective, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 101–02 (2013) (“While scholars 
may accept the new realities of complexity theory, much of environmental and 
natural resources law remain based in paradigms of complicatedness, 
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on that critique of environmental law, Parts III and IV of this 
Article suggest that mitigation efforts may be improved by 
applying a similar analysis to the overlapping social, ecological, 
and technical systems affecting global energy policy, which can 
be accurately conceptualized as a single large complex system 
(“the global energy system”) that is the core subject of climate 
change mitigation regulation. 
Complex systems theory offers a perspective and a mode of 
analysis that is radically different than many of the 
assumptions underlying the law generally and environmental 
law in particular. The most familiar manifestation of this 
arises in debate over the need for flexibility in the face of 
uncertainty, contrasted with the value of certainty and finality 
in legal rules and legally significant decisions.130 A further 
exposition of complexity theory concepts may elucidate the 
value of rethinking pre-existing legal approaches to complex 
issues such as climate change. 
Complexity theory originated in the physical sciences in 
the early to middle twentieth century and, with some 
modification, became particularly important in ecological 
science by the 1990s.131 By the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, the concept of “socio-ecological systems” (SESs) had 
developed as a useful way of understanding the interactions of 
human social systems with natural environmental systems. 
The majority of literature on SESs examines relatively small 
scales, such as forest or wetland ecosystems.132 However, there 
                                                          
predictability, and stationarity—always a bad fit to ecological reality, and an 
increasingly problematic mismatch in a climate change era.”). 
 130. One interesting example highlighting the challenges of this tension 
was the attempt to transform forest management under the George W. Bush 
administration, which adopted the language of adaptive management—long 
called for by environmentalists—in an attempt to remove the firm regulatory 
requirements that limit logging in national forests. Andrew Long, Auditing for 
Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of Science, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
1, 5 (2006). 
 131. See Ruhl, Complexity Theory, supra note 9, at 857 n.9. 
 132. See, e.g., Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 948–49 (using the example 
of a single tree as a complex-adaptive system); cf. Ahjond S. Garmestani et al., 
Panarchy, Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building 
Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (2009) (“Scale is the critical variable in 
monitoring and therefore policy associated with linked socio-ecological 
systems. Cumulative impacts have the capacity to ‘scale up’ in terms of their 
effect. As an illustration, large scale destruction and degradation of wetlands, 
and the ecological services associated with those wetlands, has occurred 
primarily as a result of innumerable, small conversions of wetlands for 
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is also a growing body of work that examines the relevance of 
the SES perspective for global-scale change.133 In 2002, Lance 
Gunderson and C.S. Holling published an edited volume 
articulating a theory of “panarchy” as an “integrative theory to 
help us understand the changes occurring globally,” which are 
“economic, ecological, social, and evolutionary.”134 Panarchy 
theory illustrates, among other things, the multiscale and 
overlapping nature of SESs.135 
Beginning with Ruhl’s work in the 1990s, a number of 
environmental law scholars have explored how complexity-
based theories may be valuable to environmental law, although 
significant analytical work remains to clarify its implications 
for governance, and few of these theoretical explorations have 
been tested through policy implementation, especially at large 
scales.136 Indeed, scholars who have written extensively on the 
importance of incorporating the insights of complexity theories 
note explicitly that it is a difficult task for which we have very 
limited guidance.137 Yet complexity theory can provide an 
                                                          
agricultural and urban development—a tyranny of many small decisions.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 133. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 14, at 478–79 (discussing the use of these 
models to simulate “the oceans, the cryosphere, the biosphere, and human 
activities”). 
 134. C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a 
Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H. 
Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). 
 135. Garmestani et al., supra note 132, at 1037 (“Unlike the top-down 
control envisioned in traditional hierarchies, connectivity between adaptive 
cycles in a panarchy can be from levels above or below. In a hierarchy, lower-
level patterns and processes are dominated by higher levels in the hierarchy. 
Panarchy differs from this characterization of nesting, with respect to complex 
systems, in that conditions can arise that trigger ‘bottom-up’ (i.e., cross-scale 
cascading) change in the system. This model of socio-ecological systems more 
accurately captures the ‘surprise’ or uncertainty inherent in such systems. 
Further, levels in a panarchy are not static states, but rather adaptive cycles 
that are interconnected to other adaptive cycles in the panarchy.”). 
 136. Andreas Duit et al., Governance, Complexity, and Resilience, 20 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 363, 365–67 (2010); see also Craig, supra note 129, at 
102 (“Complexity theory and resilience thinking offer the brightest hope for 
the future of environmental and natural resources law and policy in this 
climate change era, and so we should all hope that they continue to inspire 
transformative scholarship.”). 
 137. E.g., J.B. Ruhl, Panarchy and the Law, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, Sept. 2012, 
at 2, 4, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art31/ES-
2012-5109.pdf (observing that “translating and operationalizing panarchy 
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alternative way of examining large social systems and their 
interaction with natural systems in order to yield policy 
insights that better account for the uncertainty often found in 
environmental challenges, as well as the uncertainties of the 
political and social systems within which law is created to 
address these challenges.138 
Complex systems are not merely “complicated” systems, 
which involve many independent variables.139 Complex systems 
are systems in which the components exhibit dependencies 
such that the system as a whole has properties that “emerge” 
and cannot be explained as the sum of the constituent parts.140 
Further, these systems demonstrate nonlinearity, meaning 
that they cannot be predicted with proportional 
mathematics.141 In applications that are most relevant to 
environmental law, a key feature of nonlinearity is its 
unpredictability, which is related to complex systems’ self-
organizing characteristics and the potential for small 
perturbations in the system to produce large and even 
transformational changes.142 This latter potential reflects the 
extreme sensitivity of complex systems in their current or 
starting states, as well as path dependency dynamics.143 It also 
                                                          
theory into law will be a very difficult undertaking,” but nonetheless warning 
that lawyers should “not underestimate the need to make that move”). 
 138. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory 
and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 172–73 (2003); 
Ruhl, supra note 131, at 892–93, 905, 913. For a creative and well-developed 
example of using complexity theory concepts to reimagine a complex 
environmental issue area, see Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity 
Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495, 502 
(2004) (taking the unique approach of describing environmental law as an 
“information platform”). 
 139. Craig, supra note 129, at 88 (“Complexity scientists generally 
distinguish complex systems from complicated systems.”). 
 140. See JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 121–22 
(1998) (discussing the limitations of only looking at the “average” behavior of 
each part of a complex system); see also Craig, supra note 129, at 88–91 
(listing several distinguishing properties of complex systems). 
 141. Ruhl, supra note 131, at 854 (“[T]he interaction of law and society can 
be modeled using the characteristics of dissipative, nonlinear dynamical 
systems; that is, when conceived as a unified system, the interaction of law 
and society evolves in an unfolding nonreversible manner that is not based on 
components with directly proportional relationships capable of being graphed 
as a straight line.” (footnote omitted)). 
 142. See id. at 875–80 (discussing chaos and its impact on complexity 
theory). 
 143. Id. 
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reflects the impossibility of fully calculating the effects of an 
intervention affecting even small components of any system in 
which the components are interdependent. Any change to one 
component will cause changes to the others, which then cause a 
new set of changes to occur, and so on in a dynamic and 
continual process that constitutes the trajectory of the 
system.144 In relatively rare instances, very minor (even 
immeasurable) changes to a small component can produce 
extremely large consequences for the system as a whole,145 but 
more often, systemic change is a process of accretion and 
reaction over time and may be understandable, but not fully 
predictable.146 
Key concepts related to change in complex systems are 
frequently discussed in terms of “resilience,” “adaptability,” and 
“transformation.”147 The use of these terms is not consistent 
throughout all types of complex systems literature, nor is it 
entirely consistent within subsets of the literature.148 
Nonetheless, each of the terms has meaning across systems 
contexts. In the “resilience thinking” literature, which is among 
the strands of complexity theory that has exerted the most 
influence on recent environmental law scholarship,149 
“resilience” is defined as the capacity of a socio-ecological 
system to change yet remain within the thresholds that define 
                                                          
 144. See David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every 
Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in 
Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1060–73 (1998) (providing an 
exceptionally clear discussion of this concept by use of a garden metaphor). 
 145. This extreme situation is an example of “power laws,” which are not 
common even in systems, but provide a very clear illustration of how different 
systems operations can be from traditional probability and common 
expectations of cause and effect. Farber, supra note 138, at 153–54. 
 146. Id. at 153. 
 147. Cf. Carl Folke et al., Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, 
Adaptability and Transformability, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, Dec. 2010, at 20, 20, 
available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art20/ES-2010-
3610.pdf (describing resilience, adaptability, and transformability as three 
central aspects of complex systems). Folke et al. use the term 
“transformability” to express an element of the concept discussed here and 
elsewhere as “transformation.” Id. 
 148. See id. at 20, 22 (noting “confusion” that results from publications 
using these terms in multiple ways; additionally, the author provides a 
glossary to clarify the definition of key terms). 
 149. See Robin K. Craig & Melinda H. Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 
AKRON L. REV. 841, 868 (2013). 
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its trajectory.150 Although several possible “system states” may 
exist inside the thresholds within which a resilient system 
tends to remain, systems are resilient when they respond to 
external or internal forces through change (perhaps even to 
other system states within the thresholds) without being 
pushed into a fundamentally different trajectory or 
fundamentally new system.151 “Adaptability” is the system’s 
ability to respond to such forces—its ability to change―which 
underlies its resilience because such responsive changes allow 
the system to avoid being fundamentally altered by the forces 
affecting it.152 On the other hand, “transformation” refers to a 
fundamental reorganization of a system into a new system with 
a different trajectory.153 This occurs when forces exceed the 
adaptive capacity of the system and thus overwhelm its ability 
to maintain resilience.154 
Other formulations of the transformation concept are also 
important to note, however, and generally refer to less radical 
changes. Thus, transformation can be understood as a change 
in the system state (without necessarily exceeding fundamental 
limits), as exemplified by changing a pasture managed for 
raising sheep to one that is managed for goats.155 The concept 
of “resilience” warrants some additional attention because not 
only has it been used to express different concepts, but also 
because at least two different types of resilience have been 
                                                          
 150. Folke et al., supra note 147, at 21; see C.S. Holling, Resilience and 
Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 1 (1973) 
(introducing the concept of resilience). 
 151. See Craig & Benson, supra note 149, at 863 (describing system states 
in the context of resilience theory). One relevant application of this concept at 
a global scale is the idea that variations between ice and non-ice ages within 
the Holocene represent changes in the system state of the planet, but not a 
fundamental transformation, and that the Anthropocene concept expresses 
the potential for fundamental transformation of these systems. See Will 
Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary 
Stewardship, 40 AMBIO 739, 755–56 (2011). 
 152. Folke et al., supra note 147, at 21 (“Adaptability captures the capacity 
of a SES to learn, combine experience and knowledge, adjust its responses to 
changing external drivers and internal processes, and continue developing 
within the current stability domain or basin of attraction.” (citation omitted)). 
 153. Id. at 22–23. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Brian Walker et al., A Handful of Heuristics and Some Propositions 
for Understanding Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, 
June 2006, at 13, 21, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol11/iss1/art13/. 
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widely recognized. The definition suggested above reflects 
“ecological resilience,” which refers to “resistance” or the ability 
to absorb disturbance without fundamental alteration of the 
system.156 The concept of “engineering resilience,” however, is 
distinct and refers to the ability to “recover” or return to a 
“steady state” of equilibrium.157 
Complex systems theory focuses on the interactions among 
components of a system, whether the system is ecological, 
social, or another type (including socio-ecological and socio-
technical).158 The theory tends to highlight the potential for 
relatively small-scale adjustments to a component or an 
interaction of components to create a ripple effect that can 
ultimately lead to large-scale changes of the system as a 
whole.159 This reflects the overlapping and nested nature of 
many systems.160 For example, smaller scale systems may 
undergo transformation in ways that serve to enhance the 
adaptability and resilience of larger-scale systems in response 
to significant forces driving change.161 The state of the system 
at one point in time generally defines the potential pathways 
through which changes may take effect and reverberate, 
although these can be very difficult or impossible to identify, let 
alone predict, because of the extremely high number of 
potential interactions and configurations within complex 
systems.162 In this way, complex systems theory accounts for 
the uncertainty and unpredictability of complex systems and 
offers an explanation, although not one that offers concrete and 
                                                          
 156. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive 
Capacity in Legal Systems: With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 
89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1376–77 (2011) (discussing the differences between 
ecological and engineering resilience concepts). 
 157. Id. at 1377 (describing the effect on the movement of a ball at the 
bottom of a tall, narrow vase (a metaphor for engineering resilience) compared 
to the effect on the movement of a ball in a wide but shallower bowl (a 
metaphor for ecological resilience) to illustrate the difference between the 
types of resilience). 
 158. See C.S. Holling, Understanding the Complexity of Economic, 
Ecological, and Social Systems, 4 ECOSYSTEMS 390, 390 (2001). 
 159. See Folke et al., supra note 147, at 20–21. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. at 24. 
 162. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 129, at 92 (“One of the important lessons 
for environmental and natural resources law from complexity science is that 
uncertainty and unpredictability are inherent limitations on the legal system’s 
ability to perfectly control and regulate its subjects . . . .”). 
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specific predictions, of how and why alterations to the 
components of a system can produce change effects ranging 
from nearly imperceptible to transformation of the system as a 
whole.163 Although this type of nonlinear process is not fully 
predictable, it may create opportunities to adjust components of 
a system in order to initiate a sequence of interactions that 
produce large-scale changes in trajectory, even where direct 
system-wide change would be practically impossible. When 
complexity analysis is applied to socio-ecological systems, it 
generally results in policy insights that are very different from 
the traditional (linear and reductionist, in most cases) 
approach to an issue.164 Climate change mitigation is no 
different from many other issues in this respect. 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE MITIGATION 
CHALLENGE AS A COMPLEX SYSTEMS PROBLEM 
Over the last fifteen to twenty years, environmental 
scholars began to recognize the value of complex systems 
theory for environmental policy analysis and design.165 
Somewhat ironically, this approach has gained the most 
traction in the context of climate change adaptation, but has 
received almost no attention in the context of climate change 
mitigation governance.166 Yet, the high level of global GHG 
emissions, particularly since the middle of the twentieth 
century, can easily be understood as an emergent property of a 
                                                          
 163. See id. at 88–89, 102 (defining complex systems and advocating the 
use of complexity theory). See generally Farber, supra note 138, at 172–73 
(arguing that power laws―where the possibility of a freak outcome weighs 
heavily in the analysis—apply to environmental issues, and that complexity 
theory can help explain such freak outcomes and suggest possible ways to 
handle them). 
 164. Among the first articles to make this point in legal scholarship was 
Ruhl, Complexity Theory, supra note 9; see also Craig, supra note 129, at 91–
93 (proposing the application of complexity science to transform 
environmental law to a dynamic governance system capable of adapting to 
change and uncertainty with reference to socio-ecological systems). 
 165. See Craig, supra note 129, at 100–01 (“Are we to the point where the 
complexity of ecosystems and socio-ecological systems is accepted as a given by 
environmental and natural resources law scholars? Probably.”). 
 166. Cf. Outka, supra note 4, at 1684–86 (discussing the complexity of the 
legal system and climate change as barriers to effective climate change 
regulation). 
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global energy system.167 This Part begins to explore whether 
examining the mitigation challenge as a complex systems 
problem, by conceiving of fossil energy dominance and related 
GHG emissions as undesirable emergent properties of a 
complex “global energy system,” can provide useful policy 
insights. 
If energy policy can accurately be understood as a complex 
global energy system, policy analysis may be made more 
fruitful by accounting for the complex systems properties it 
possesses.168 Attention to the dynamic and nonlinear processes 
of complex systems, sensitivity to system state and path 
dependency, and the potential for relatively small alterations to 
provoke the emergence of major systemic state changes at a 
very large scale provide ways of thinking about the global 
energy system that are likely to yield policy recommendations 
very different from the incremental and legalistic efforts that 
have characterized most of environmental law, in the United 
States and internationally, and which have repeatedly failed to 
produce significant climate change mitigation.169 
It would be hard to imagine a global system that is less 
likely than the global energy system to respond to the types of 
reductionist processes and methods that have come to 
characterize nearly all of environmental law at both domestic 
and international levels.170 Thus, if global energy governance 
holds out hope for climate change mitigation—and with the 
                                                          
 167. See, e.g., Felder, supra note 9, at 89 (describing the global energy 
system as “a complex, large-scale, integrated, open, and socio-technical 
(CLIOS) system”); see also JOSEPH M. SUSSMAN, THE “CLIOS PROCESS:” A 
USER’S GUIDE (2007), available at http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/engineering-
systems-division/esd-04j-frameworks-and-models-in-engineering-systems-
engineering-system-design-spring-2007/readings/clios_process.pdf (discussing 
the CLIOS systems, which is a concept that grows from engineering 
literature). 
 168. See Felder, supra note 9, at 105. 
 169. See id. at 104–05. 
 170. Id. at 93 (“Coincident with the needs of policymakers to reevaluate 
global climate change mitigation policy, the importance of a multi-disciplinary 
approach to solving intractable social problems has long been recognized. 
These problems consist of intertwined technological and social complexities 
that cannot be adequately addressed by a reductionist scientific approach.” 
(footnote omitted)); see Goldthau & Sovacool, supra note 98, at 232 (“As we 
shall argue in this article, energy is, among all policy fields exhibiting 
externalities of a global scale, by far the most complex, path dependent, and 
embedded one.”); see also Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252–56 
(discussing the challenges of energy governance). 
1092 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
near collapse of UNFCCC process focused primarily on 
traditional environmental law approaches, it may be the only 
hope—proposals need to account for the extremely messy 
governance structure and the multiple layers of social and 
economic issues that characterize energy policy.171 More 
importantly, to be effective, such proposals should account for 
the interaction of the diverse and diffuse components of energy 
policy. It is the interactions of these components that are most 
relevant to demonstrate the existence of a complex global 
energy system because it is through this interaction that the 
system produces emergent properties.172 Chief among the 
emergent properties is the dominance of fossil-fuel-based 
technologies.173 The longstanding dominance of these 
technologies is an example of what technology literature often 
describes as technological “lock-in,” but which will be more 
familiar to environmental law scholars as a form of 
resilience.174 One way of thinking about climate change, then, 
                                                          
 171. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasizing the need to move 
on from our current global climate governance system and pursue “a web of 
multi-level, multi-scale systems” to accommodate the complex economic, 
social, and political issues presented by climate change); Sovacool & Florini, 
supra note 106, at 260–63 (discussing potentially promising approaches to 
reforming global energy governance). 
 172. See, e.g., Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252 (listing examples 
of the “disparate topics” that global energy regulators are tasked with 
addressing); see also Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and 
Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 920 (2005) (“When mechanisms of self-
assembly lead to properties of a system that are not shared by its constituent 
parts, these properties are called emergent.”). 
 173. See Davies, supra note 4, at 481 (“Energy regulation in the United 
States clearly ‘favors large-scale, high-technology, capital-intensive, 
integrated, and centralized producers of energy from fossil fuels.’” (quoting 
Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 355, 375 (1990))); see also IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 
(stating that fossil fuels accounted for 81% of the global energy supply in 
2012). 
 174. See Duit et al., supra note 136, at 365–67 (applying the concept of 
resilience to governance issues). See generally Sovacool, supra note 76, at 
4504–12 (examining the economic, political, and behavioral impediments of 
implementing renewable energy systems which in turn support the continued 
dominance of fossil fuels). One may fairly question whether the resilience of 
the global energy system in a state of fossil fuel dominance is ecological 
resilience or engineering resilience. Arguably, events such as the 1970s oil 
crisis suggest that the system tends to “bounce back” rather than absorb 
shocks and, thus, can be understood as exhibiting engineering resilience 
rather than ecological resilience. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying 
text. 
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is to view fossil fuel dominance as a particularly important 
emergent property of the global energy system, one which has 
become so dominant that it threatens the stability of other 
systems interacting with the energy system—most notably, the 
climate system. 
A. THE GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM 
In his 1997 article calling for a transformation of 
environmental law, J.B. Ruhl encouraged creation of an 
environmental law system that enables “complex adaptive 
system forces to take hold and flourish,”175 a theme which has 
been echoed with increasing frequency in recent years. Of 
course, basing a regulatory strategy on complex-systems forces 
presupposes that one is working with a complex system. So, 
how does one determine whether a large-scale system such as 
the global energy system is indeed a complex system? In 
assessing the objects of environmental regulation, Ruhl 
identifies the following general properties of complex adaptive 
systems: aggregation, nonlinearity, flows, diversity, and self-
criticality.176 In discussing complexity theory as a descriptive 
tool for administrative law, Donald Hornstein identifies 
emergence from self-assembly, sensitivity to initial conditions, 
and nonlinearity as indicative of a complex system.177 In a 
recent article analyzing international environmental law as a 
complex adaptive system, the authors point to related processes 
of nonlinearity, emergence, and self-organization.178 One could 
also examine the literature from other disciplines, particularly 
literature which explores differences between natural and 
human systems in terms of complexity and adaptive 
                                                          
 175. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 942; see also id. at 941–42 
(suggesting that the transformation should embrace an overall goal of global 
sustainable development, with decision-making processes based upon adaptive 
management principles, and the use of biodiversity preservation as a 
performance metric). 
 176. Id. at 943–53. See generally J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The 
Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory 
to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of 
Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997) (discussing similar 
properties of complex adaptive systems). 
 177. Hornstein, supra note 172, at 913, 916. 
 178. Rakhyun E. Kim & Brendan Mackey, International Environmental 
Law as a Complex Adaptive System, 14 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 5, 7–8 
(2014). 
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characteristics,179 which may have value in future efforts to 
define precise reform actions aimed at mitigating climate 
change through the global energy system. It is also important 
to recognize that complexity theory includes concepts related to 
the “attractors” of systems.180 Attractors can be “strange” and 
complex, but can also be more stable, fixed or cyclical, and some 
mix of these attractors is at play in most systems, leading to 
their adaptability on what has been called the “edge of 
chaos.”181 For present purposes, however, a general recognition 
of complex systems properties is sufficient to illustrate that the 
global energy system acts as a complex system. Thus, I suggest 
that the global energy system can be understood as a complex 
system through two clusters of related characteristics: (1) self-
organization and emergence, reflecting what Ruhl describes as 
“aggregation;”182 and (2) nonlinearity through flows based on a 
sensitivity to initial conditions, reflecting both the concept of 
path dependency and the potential for small changes to effect 
large systemic effects that may, on relatively rare occasions, 
even lead to fundamental transformation of the system (such 
transformation is often referred to as “catastrophe”).183 
Moreover, the multiscalar and overlapping legal, sectoral, and 
physical systems composing the global energy system illustrate 
that it has characteristics of a panarchy.184 Many of these 
features are illustrated in the discussion above, but are made 
somewhat more explicit through a brief analysis below.   
                                                          
 179. See, e.g., Holling, supra note 158, at 401 (stating that human systems 
exhibit three unique features: “foresight, communication, and technology”). 
 180. See Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 419 n.27 (“An attractor is simply 
a model representation of the potential long term behavior of the system, a 
useful concept for exploring different kinds of long-term behavior. The 
attractor is not a force of attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system, 
but simply depicts where the system is headed based on the rules of motion in 
the system.” (citation omitted)). 
 181. See id. at 418–23. 
 182. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 945. 
 183. See, e.g., Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 421 (“This is known as 
catastrophe behavior.”). 
 184. See Ruhl, supra note 156, at 1383 (“Resilience theory does not posit 
that a system as complex as law is entirely either a vase or a saucer; rather, it 
is more a set of landscapes over which we find engineering and ecological 
resilience strategies mixing in different blends to form topographies of various 
contours depending on where in the system we look. Some resilience theorists 
refer to this multiscalar complex of topographies as a ‘panarchy.’” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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The global energy system exhibits self-organization and 
emergence, meaning that through interactions of its 
components, the system itself produces properties that cannot 
be explained through analysis of individual components or as 
the imposition of an external actor.185 This type of behavior is 
apparent in many features of the global energy system, 
including the market structure that leads to pricing and price 
fluctuation but also in more fundamental aspects such as the 
dominance of fossil fuels throughout the system.186 The role of 
interaction in creating emergent properties is apparent in 
several features of energy policy highlighted in Part I, supra. 
The following two processes that created and reinforce fossil 
fuel dominance in global energy policy suggest an interactive 
process: (1) the tightly coupled national political and financial 
reinforcement of fossil fuel dominance, to the point that 
hundreds of billions of dollars in annual subsidies support 
fossil fuel dominance; and (2) control of these resources has 
exhibited an undeniable influence on the shape of overarching 
global political power relationships (including, but not limited 
to, empowering oil-rich nations) in ways that were 
unpredictable, leading to strong international political 
reinforcement of fossil fuel use and expansion, thus acting to 
preserve their dominance of fossil fuel energy throughout the 
globe.187 
In addition, the global energy system reached its current 
state through a long series of events that bear the mark of 
nonlinearity and which provoke changes through flows, 
primarily of oil and money.188 The technology of the global 
energy system, for example, includes some of the most 
surprising and important inventions and discoveries dating 
back to the Industrial Revolution.189 From before the 
development of electricity through well after the price shocks of 
the 1970s, the history of the global energy system is 
punctuated with events that resulted from a confluence of 
circumstances and created significant leaps forward in the 
potential for society to meet its material needs and desires, 
                                                          
 185. See, e.g., Kim & Mackey, supra note 178, at 7–8. 
 186. See id.; supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra Part I.D. These examples are meant to illustrate the type of 
processes at play, not to provide an exhaustive survey. 
 188. See, e.g., Sovacool, supra note 76, at 4506–09. 
 189. See Kim & Mackey, supra note 178, at 9. 
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which then established a new technological status quo that 
established the parameters of potential future social and 
technological paths.190 Although tracing the threads that have 
shaped the current system is beyond the scope of this Article, it 
is notable that features of the energy system are often cited as 
examples of nonlinear systems behavior.191 
Although the core premise of this Article requires 
understanding the global energy system as a complex system, 
this Article does not take a position on whether it is useful to 
think of the global energy system as a complex adaptive 
system. There is room for argument about what, specifically, 
makes a complex system adaptive.192 Certainly, the resilience 
of the system and its apparent balance between order and 
chaos suggest adaptive qualities.193 However, other hallmarks 
of adaptability, such as diversity, which Ruhl describes as “the 
signature of complex adaptive systems,”194 may be lacking in 
the global energy system. Indeed, one could argue that it is the 
lack of diversity represented by the dominance of fossil fuel 
technologies that prompts the desire to catalyze transformation 
of the system away from its current state. Thus, to some extent, 
the degree to which the global energy system is viewed as 
adaptable may depend on the way in which one defines the 
system. Viewed narrowly, in terms of the path upon which it 
has thus far developed, one might wish to emphasize the non-
adaptive characteristics of the system because it is precisely 
those features that should be targeted in transformation efforts 
(a theme often repeated in the socio-technical literature 
discussed below). However, viewed broadly, in terms of the 
system’s ability to support social goals and meet human needs, 
one can understand the system’s potential for adaptation as a 
                                                          
 190. Cf. Schipper, supra note 13, at 87 tbl.1 (summarizing the “historical 
framing of climate change debate and adaptation thinking” from the 1960s 
onward). 
 191. E.g., Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 444–45 (discussing the 
apparently random events, including discovery of oil in Texas and the 
resulting low cost of gasoline, leading to the rise of the automobile in the early 
twentieth century). See generally Felder, supra note 9 (analyzing the global 
energy system as a complex system in greater detail). 
 192. E.g., Kim & Mackey, supra note 178, at 8 (“[Complex adaptive 
systems] are special cases of complex systems, although the line between them 
and complex systems is not clear.”). 
 193. See Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 947. 
 194. Id. at 948–49. 
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prerequisite to advocating for change. The goal of 
transformation, after all, is not to destabilize the provision of 
energy, but merely to change the current state of the system 
through which such energy is produced and supplied.195 In this 
sense, the goal of climate change mitigation efforts is to alter 
the path upon which the system has, in a self-organizing way, 
established itself, and to do so in a manner that averts the 
types of devastating social consequences (such as those 
discussed in models of extreme climate change or in predictions 
of peak oil and subsequently dwindling supply) that appear 
likely to force the system onto another path at some point in 
the future in order to avoid collapse. In this sense, climate 
change mitigation may be understood as an effort to speed a 
process of change that is likely to occur anyway and, by doing 
so, avoid the most severe consequences of the status quo. 
B. THE GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
Most environmental law literature that considers 
complexity theory focuses on its application to natural systems 
with desirable characteristics, and, by extension, to a system of 
law designed to promote environmental quality by preventing 
undesirable transformation of environmental systems.196 Thus, 
this literature generally discusses resilience and adaptation as 
desirable qualities—things to be nurtured in environmental 
systems and fostered in legal systems that aim to promote 
environmental quality.197 While there is recognition that 
undesirable characteristics or features of a system may be 
resilient, this possibility is rarely discussed in any depth by 
environmental law literature, especially as it relates to social 
(rather than ecological) systems.198 However, attention to the 
                                                          
 195. Cf. Folke, supra note 147, at 23 (“[T]ransformability has been defined 
as ‘the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when ecological, 
economic, or social structures make the existing system untenable.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 196. See, e.g., Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941–42. 
 197. E.g., Craig & Benson, supra note 149, at 844 (arguing that “resilience” 
should replace “sustainability” as a policy goal of environmental law). 
 198. E.g., id. (noting the possibility of resilience in undesirable components 
without discussing application of the concept of negative resilience to social 
systems); see also Mary J. Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of 
Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 1000 (2009) 
(observing that resilience of ecosystems in undesirable system states may 
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resilience of undesirable features may have value to 
environmental law at various scales. For example, at the 
ecosystem scale it may prove useful for addressing issues such 
as invasive species. It may also be valuable in understanding 
undesirable characteristics of global social systems, such as the 
dominance of fossil fuels in the global energy system and the 
emergence of climate change. Of course, even high resilience 
can give way, producing transformation. Although discussions 
of resilience of undesirable system components rarely receive 
attention in environmental law literature (and even in 
ecologically oriented systems literature), another area of 
literature based on complexity theory has transformation to 
displace resilient undesirable system components as a primary 
focus. This literature analyzes “socio-technical systems” by 
drawing on a complex systems understanding of social forces 
and technological forces.199 
Benjamin Sovacool recently noted that “one of the most 
salient characteristics of modern industrial systems such as 
telephones and power networks is the degree to which they are 
not salient for most people, most of the time.”200 For many 
people, existing technological systems are taken as a given, 
which obscures their contingent nature.201 Attention to the 
socio-technical context of technology, including the interacting 
social and technical sources of technological constraints, makes 
explicit the processes and systemic forces that define current 
                                                          
require management actions to achieve more desirable states). But see Ruhl, 
supra note 156, 1381–84 (discussing resilience in the context of the legal 
system as normatively neutral, noting examples of resilience in undesirable 
elements such as slavery, and observing that transformation is desirable in 
some instances). 
 199. Cf. Stephen M. McCauley & Jennie C. Stephens, Green Energy 
Clusters and Socio-technical Transitions: Analysis of a Sustainable Energy 
Cluster for Regional Economic Development in Central Massachusetts, USA, 7 
SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 213, 213–14 (2012) (“The transformation of complex 
socio-technical systems, and particularly the shift from a fossil fuel-based 
energy system to one reliant on renewable energy sources, involves a 
significant re-shaping of regional, place-based infrastructures, economic 
systems, and social practices.”). See generally THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS 
OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880–1930 (1983) 
(providing a background for establishing socio-technical theory). 
 200. Sovacool, supra note 76, at 4502 (citing Paul N. Edwards, 
Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the 
History of Sociotechnical Systems, in MODERNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 185–226 
(Thomas J. Misa et al. eds., 2003)). 
 201. See id. at 4502–03. 
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limits and thereby draws attention to the horizon of 
technological possibility.202 In environmental law discussions, 
which often focus on risk and harm prevention, the significant 
potential for law and policy to affect socio-technical systems in 
ways that expand this horizon can easily be lost. 
The goals of socio-technical systems research include not 
only to understand the interaction of social and technological 
systems as a general matter, but also to develop an operational 
understanding of the relevant processes in order to enable 
intentional transformation of highly resilient and undesirable 
aspects of socio-technical systems.203 The dominance of fossil 
fuel-based technologies in energy systems is among the 
primary examples of a resilient undesirable characteristic of 
socio-technical systems. As one article notes, socio-technical 
literature often differs from SES literature in that “where 
existing regimes are judged to be unsustainable, for instance, 
in energy . . . socio-technical resilience is an undesirable 
property,” and the goal of systemic analysis is to stimulate 
“radical regime change.”204 Thus, in the language of systems 
theory more generally, much socio-technical research aims to 
identify potential pathways for transformation of systems with 
highly resilient and highly undesirable properties.205 
Conceptualizing fossil energy’s dominant place in the energy 
system and the climate change resulting therefrom in this way 
may provide a fresh perspective on the law and policy questions 
confronting efforts to address climate change, suggesting that 
law and policy scholars may draw value from greater attention 
to socio-technical systems literature. 
Most significantly, the concept of “negative resilience” and 
conceptualizing mitigation as a goal related to transformation 
of the energy system may prove crucial to developing more 
effective governance intervention strategies to promote 
mitigation. As the projections of the IEA and others suggest, 
                                                          
 202. See id. at 4503. 
 203. Adrian Smith & Andy Stirling, The Politics of Social-Ecological 
Resilience and Sustainable Socio-technical Transitions, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, 
Mar. 2010, at 11, 14, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol15/iss1/art11 (“The aim of socio-technical research is thus usually focused 
on explaining and overcoming this negative resilience.” (citation omitted)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id; Walker et al., supra note 155, at 21 (“Transformation involves 
changing the state space of the system and the scales of the panarchy.”). 
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there is a very real risk that the dominance of fossil fuels in the 
global energy system will become even more entrenched and 
pronounced over the coming decades.206 As the preceding Parts 
explained, there are social (including political and economic) 
reasons for this, and these are reinforced by current 
technological limitations. Thus, a context-sensitive 
understanding of the obstacles facing legal and political 
responses to climate change may be a prerequisite to designing 
and implementing an effective legal and political mitigation 
strategy. This strategy must also include attention to the socio-
technical system that is a part of the global SES in which 
climate change has emerged as a severe threat. In other words, 
greater attention to the process of technological change in 
society will likely lead to more effective proposals for legal 
reform.207 
Although legal literature recognizes that the barriers to 
technological change represent one of the fundamental 
differences between the success of the Montreal Protocol and 
the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, analyses of the issue rarely 
dig beyond well-known considerations such as the role of 
economic incentives and the potential for law to operate as a 
technology forcing mechanism.208 The socio-technical literature 
may thus provide an element—in-depth analysis of the 
interaction between social forces and technical aspects of 
technological change—that is both essential to addressing 
climate change and vastly underrepresented in environmental 
law literature. For example, fossil fuel-based electricity 
generation presents a paradigmatic example of “strongly 
embedded, self-reinforcing systems” and has received 
significant attention in socio-technical research.209 Recent 
socio-technical work examining the context for a renewable 
energy transition in the United States includes an assessment 
of barriers to renewable electricity210 and of the emergence of 
                                                          
 206. E.g., IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (predicting that fossil fuels 
will remain the dominant source of energy through at least 2035). 
 207. Cf. Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 444–52 (describing the use of 
technological change as an analogous context for analyzing the law as a 
complex system). 
 208. See generally Sunstein, supra note 76 (demonstrating that the 
importance of technological considerations is apparent throughout the 
literature that has compared the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol). 
 209. Smith & Stirling, supra note 203, at 13. 
 210. Sovacool, supra note 76. 
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small-scale clusters of renewable power within communities.211 
Similar research in the United Kingdom provides insights into 
the role of public perception and reception in a shift from 
centralized fossil energy and associated policy structures to 
more heterogeneous and diffuse renewable energy 
alternatives.212 Work of this nature holds significant promise 
for enabling law and policy scholars to better understand the 
context in which an effective climate change response must 
operate and, thus, may inform the development of both legal 
analysis that better accounts for existing extra-legal 
constraints and concrete policy proposals that have a greater 
chance of achieving desired results. 
The input of law and policy scholars may also prove to be a 
welcome compliment to existing efforts of socio-technical 
systems analysis. Much of the socio-technical literature 
explores how multiscale technological change relates to 
economic and other social forces without addressing key 
questions of law and policy design necessary for applying such 
insights in a way that can catalyze transformation of the 
energy system.213 Indeed, some early work attempting to draw 
on socio-technical theory to facilitate clean energy technology 
was sharply criticized for relatively simplistic and mechanistic 
treatment of governance processes.214 As the field has grown, it 
                                                          
 211. McCauley & Stephens, supra note 199. 
 212. E.g., C. Nolden, The Governance of Innovation Diffusion—A Socio-
technical Analysis of Energy Policy, 33 EPJ WEB CONFERENCES, art. 01012, at 
4–6 (2012), available at http://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/abs/
2012/15/epjconf_e2c2012_01012/epjconf_e2c2012_01012.html (evaluating the 
United Kingdom’s focus in renewable energy such as offshore wind and solar 
PV). 
 213. See Smith & Stirling, supra note 203, at 18–19 (discussing the 
political (and, implicitly, legal) questions left open by socio-technical systems 
literature relevant to sustainability and clean energy). See generally FRANK 
W. GEELS, TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS AND SYSTEM INNOVATIONS: A CO-
EVOLUTIONARY AND SOCIO-TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 103–245 (2005) (providing 
complexity-based analysis of three major technological changes in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, along with general 
conclusions). 
 214. E.g., Smith & Stirling, supra note 203, at 17 (“[C]ritical political 
dynamics challenge straightforward managerial understandings of transition 
management.” (citation omitted)); see also Audley Genus & Anne-Marie Coles, 
Rethinking the Multi-level Perspective of Technological Transitions, 37 RES. 
POL’Y 1436, 1444 (2008) (“An aspect of this is to consider how, the extent to 
which, and in what circumstances state organisations and other interested or 
affected actors affect the diffusion of technology through society.”). 
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has come to provide not only insights into the barriers to 
technological transition, but also increasingly well-developed 
models of technological change215 and a range of relevant case 
studies that may assist in understanding the conditions 
through which transition to clean energy technology can 
occur.216 Such models and case studies can be seen as offering 
key information and analytical frameworks for understanding 
the catalytic role that law can play in technological change on 
multiple scales, even if much of the current literature lacks 
sophisticated attention to legal and political analysis to inform 
reform strategies. In some respects, the insights of socio-
technical literature hold a potential value for designing more 
effective legal tools to achieve mitigation that is similar to what 
SESs literature offers for adaptation. It may, therefore, offer a 
particularly relevant and helpful source for environmental law 
scholars seeking to understand alternatives to the failed 
approach of the Kyoto Protocol and efforts toward 
comprehensive U.S. climate change legislation. 
IV. FROM COMPLEXITY THEORY TO EFFECTIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ENERGY 
SYSTEM FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
As others have recognized, incorporating concepts from 
complex systems theory into law and governance presents a 
significant challenge.217 The high level of abstraction common 
                                                          
 215. E.g., Adrian Smith et al., The Governance of Sustainable Socio-
technical Transitions, 34 RES. POL’Y 1491, 1491–92 (2005) (developing a model 
based on articulation of selection pressures and availability of resources that 
create an adaptive capacity for regime transition). 
 216. E.g., Halina S. Brown & Philip J. Vergragt, Bounded Socio-technical 
Experiments as Agents of Systemic Change: The Case of a Zero-Energy 
Residential Building, 75 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 107, 
127–28 (2008) (describing the use of small-scale projects to create social 
receptivity to technological change); Daphne Ngar-yin Mah et al., Governing 
the Transition of Socio-technical Systems: A Case Study of the Development of 
Smart Grids in Korea, 45 ENERGY POL’Y 133 (2012); Jennie C. Stephens & 
Scott Jiusto, Assessing Innovation in Emerging Energy Technologies: Socio-
technical Dynamics of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Enhanced 
Geothermal Systems (EGS) in the USA, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2020 (2010); Rob 
Wall & Tracey Crosbie, Potential for Reducing Electricity Demand for Lighting 
in Households: An Exploratory Socio-technical Study, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 1021 
(2009). 
 217. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 175–78. 
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in complexity theory218 can make the task appear particularly 
daunting. While the research-related suggestions articulated 
above are likely to improve knowledge and enhance the ability 
to create effective interventions into the global energy 
system,219 the urgency and immense stakes of climate change 
make it particularly important that progress toward a more 
effective approach moves from theory to practice as quickly as 
possible.220 To that end, this Part explores some of the key 
attributes of reform suggested by viewing climate change as an 
emergent property of the global energy system. 
Energy-related legal reforms aimed at operationalizing 
complexity theory may be aided by recognition that law itself 
can be understood as a complex system, which operates within 
the context of a broader complex governance system, which 
forms a component of the global energy system, itself a part of 
broader socio-ecological and socio-technical systems.221 
Likewise, climate change represents alteration of the climate 
system, which can be understood as a complex system 
operating as a component of a broader “Earth system,” which 
can also be understood to include the raw materials from which 
energy is generated (including, but not limited to, fossil fuels). 
This very broad description of the relevant interacting systems 
reflects the concept of “panarchy,” which describes dynamic 
processes within and across scales.222 It serves to illustrate the 
multiple forces operating in and around the emergence of 
climate change,223 which results most directly, of course, from 
the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere—a byproduct of the 
current energy system that affects the climate system in ways 
that have been increasingly recognized and described by 
scientists for over a century.224 Among other reasons, keeping 
                                                          
 218. See supra Part II. 
 219. See supra Part III.B. 
 220. See generally PARRY ET AL., supra note 43 (discussing predicted 
climate change impact scenarios). 
 221. As J.B. Ruhl suggests, “we must think of environmental law as a 
complex adaptive system” in order to address complex environmental issues. 
Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 980. 
 222. E.g., Holling, supra note 158, at 397–98, 401. 
 223. See supra Part II. 
 224. E.g., The Carbon Dioxide Greenhouse Effect, The Discovery of Global 
Warming, AM. INST. PHYSICS, http://www.aip.org/history/climate/co2.htm (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014) (describing the history of the science behind climate 
change). 
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this broad perspective in mind when developing approaches to 
mitigation can be helpful because it reminds us that the most 
analytically simple approach to a specific problem may not be 
the most desirable course of action and that we will likely fail 
to achieve desired results if we fail to appreciate the context in 
which legal reform efforts must operate. In the case of climate 
change, the most analytically simple approach is probably 
direct reduction of GHG emissions through specific targets (the 
Kyoto Protocol’s goal), and repeated failures to successfully 
implement this approach suggest that more contextually-
sensitive alternative approaches are necessary to obtain the 
desired result. Complex systems analysis offers a way of 
thinking that is highly sensitive to context. 
It may also prove useful to briefly consider whether 
“ecosystem” or “economy,” as discussed above,225 provides a 
better perspective for governance in this instance. Although the 
goals of climate change regulation are undoubtedly relevant to 
(and perhaps only comprehensible in terms of) the broad 
planetary housekeeping implied by an ecosystem perspective, 
efforts to impose environmental law controls through the 
UNFCCC are efforts to inject an exogenous element into the 
many interacting social and physical systems that create 
climate change. On the other hand, employing a more 
“economic” focus on energy governance reforms seeks to 
promote changes to a human-imposed ordering (the energy 
system) that interacts with broader ecosystem forces, and the 
likelihood of prompting ripple effects throughout the human-
created energy system may be more readily assessed. Focusing 
on energy governance rather than environmental harm may 
thus help to understand the components subject to potential 
policy action, as well as their interconnection with other 
components of the system. Rather than imposing an alternative 
framing of the issue (environmental harm), reforms that 
conceptualize the energy system as a human-imposed ordering 
of social and economic concerns may have the benefit of 
focusing on modifications to existing arrangements within the 
system that are most relevant to directing human behavior 
(such as the relationship of various political interests in the 
                                                          
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
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energy system to other politically important interests that may 
affect the ability to secure legal reforms).226 
With these broad points in mind, the remainder of this 
Part suggests that reforms may be most helpful to catalyzing 
energy system transformation if they focus on: (1) framing 
goals to secure political support; (2) reforming structural 
arrangements to support technological transformation; and (3) 
promoting interaction—among components of the energy 
system and with components of related systems—that produces 
beneficial effects for the communities involved while tending to 
encourage transformation of the global energy system as a 
whole. These elements of reform are discussed briefly below. 
A. SIMPLE COMPLEXITY: POLITICAL AND IMPLEMENTATION 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Situating law and governance in systems terms—as 
components of overlapping systems that operate across 
multiple geographic and jurisdictional scales while intersecting 
with various other policy spaces—highlights the need to remain 
mindful of the interaction of each element of the governance 
system with other governance system components and with 
components of other systems. In a sense, it provides an 
appropriately humble position from which to observe the global 
political interaction that ultimately determines whether 
governance regimes are created and reformed. Thus, it may be 
that complexity theory appropriately “inculcates a sense of 
uncertainty” in global political analysis.227 Policy proposals 
drawn from complexity theory, which try to account for and 
manage uncertainty, also tend to be relatively complex.228 For 
example, the authors of the introduction to a special issue of 
the journal Global Environmental Change on governing 
complex SESs suggest that existing literature firmly supports 
                                                          
 226. Cf. supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the issues related to energy 
governance and geopolitics). 
 227. Neil E. Harrison, Complex Systems and the Practice of World Politics, 
in COMPLEXITY IN WORLD POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW 
PARADIGM 183, 193 (Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006) (“[The complexity] paradigm 
can increase our understanding of the complexity of world politics and reduce 
the probability of surprising events.”). 
 228. For an example of a policy proposal to manage uncertainty, see 
Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 64–76 
(2009). 
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the notion that “in order to govern processes of complex change, 
complexity in the external world must be matched by 
complexity in the governance system.”229 They point to concepts 
such as polycentric governance and adaptive governance, as 
well as literature on network governance and other relatively 
flexible approaches, as evidence of the concept’s broad 
acceptance among scholars.230 
Although both governance and political processes may be 
accurately described by complexity analysis, success in politics 
(domestically and, ultimately, globally) also requires gaining 
widespread public support, particularly for the creation or 
reform of mechanisms aimed at addressing controversial topics 
like climate change.231 In part, the ability to gain favorable 
public opinion depends upon the information costs (or mental 
effort) required to understand the issues at stake and the 
proposals for which support is sought, as well as their 
alignment with existing political arrangements.232 Following 
the principle of least effort, the human mind very often 
operates like a reductionist machine that simplifies 
information to reduce the effort of understanding it.233 
Although it is certainly possible for people to grapple with 
complexity, many seem to avoid it whenever possible.234 In the 
context of climate policy, for example, social science evidence 
suggests that people apply heuristic processing and align their 
views with political elites rather than incur the information 
costs (or apply the mental effort) to understand the scientific 
                                                          
 229. Duit et al., supra note 136, at 365. 
 230. Id. at 365–67 (describing various articles on the issue). 
 231. E.g., Cynthia R. Rugeley & John D. Gerlach, Understanding 
Environmental Public Opinion by Dimension: How Heuristic Processing 
Mitigates High Information Costs on Complex Issues, 40 POL. & POL’Y 444, 
445–46 (2012) (collecting literature on public opinion in the political process). 
 232. Id. at 463. 
 233. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 38 (2011) (observing 
that people “normally avoid mental overload by dividing our tasks into 
multiple easy steps” and “conduct [their] mental lives by the law of least 
effort”). 
 234. Id. at 45 (“[M]any people . . . . apparently find cognitive effort at least 
mildly unpleasant and avoid it as much as possible.”). The bio-psychological 
reasons for this appear to have an evolutionary origin. Id. at 35 (discussing 
the positive emotional state triggered by cognitive ease as an evolutionarily 
important biological signal). Although outside the scope of this Article, it is 
interesting to consider how this perspective may help in understanding why 
law and policy have historically been so reductionist. 
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information necessary for an informed opinion.235 Therefore, 
reforming energy policy on the basis of insights derived from 
complexity theory will require presenting such proposals in 
terms that are either readily accessible to the public or, more 
likely, capable of gaining support from influential leaders. 
Achieving such support on the global level, outside the context 
of a pre-existing issue regime, poses a substantial obstacle that 
will likely require context-specific analysis in order to achieve 
concrete reforms in specific places or sectors.236 Although a full 
discussion is outside of the scope of this Article, consideration 
of key elements of a global approach can be identified and 
briefly discussed. The first aspect of a global approach is the 
identification of relatively clear goals that can guide reform 
efforts and gain political support. 
B. GOAL OF REFORM: CATALYZING TECHNOLOGICAL 
TRANSFORMATION 
The core purpose of reform as envisioned by this Article is 
to reduce GHG emissions, and thereby mitigate climate change, 
by dislodging the dominant place of fossil-fuel-dependent 
technologies in the global energy system.237 The more rapidly, 
decisively, and completely this transformation can occur 
(without harmful social destabilization), the better. If one looks 
at energy policy in traditional environmental or international 
law terms (i.e., as the subject of traditional political science and 
international relations analysis), the challenge may seem 
overwhelming.238 From any perspective, it is daunting. But 
complexity offers a lens through which rapid wholesale 
transformation of the GHG-belching engines that drove the 
Industrial Revolution into low-GHG clean tech for the 
                                                          
 235. Cf. Rugeley & Gerlach, supra note 231, at 448–49 (“[I]n an effort to 
mitigate [ ] information costs, citizens look to their political affiliations and 
the media when forming public opinions on climate change.”). This type of 
psychological simplification may also offer some explanation for why 
environmental governance remains so reductionist and fragmented despite 
the rising chorus of scientific and scholarly voices advocating adoption of 
approaches that are better suited to environmental systems. See supra note 
213 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra Part I.C. 
 237. Clearly, this goal is likely to incite opposition from fossil fuel interests, 
see, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 706 F.3d 474, 476 (2013), 
which simply enhances the need for public support. 
 238. See supra Part I.D. 
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information age becomes possible, but by no means certain, in a 
way that appears inconceivable through a continuation of the 
UNFCCC or other harm-focused approaches.239 In other areas 
of environmental law, focusing squarely on the environmental 
harm as a basis for reforms has frequently created a dynamic 
in which legal regimes arise as reactions to a specific crisis that 
triggers public and political responses.240 Following that course 
in the climate context, as UNFCCC negotiations and much of 
U.S. political discourse seems to be doing, may mean that 
major social and economic disruption—perhaps even 
catastrophe in the complex systems sense—will be required 
before any meaningful legal response to climate change arises 
on the global scale. A complexity perspective targeted toward 
the global energy system offers a real alternative mode of 
analysis that may reveal pathways to transformation that 
averts the type of crises that have driven past environmental 
law creation. Yet, by its very nature, the details of 
transformation in a complex system cannot be fully predicted 
or planned in advance. Whatever dream there might have been 
for a grand global environmental regime implementing a plan 
that charts a course to a future of universal environmental 
sustainability is over and it should not be resurrected in the 
guise of complexity. Instead, with an appreciation of context in 
mind, the specific goals of reform should be formulated through 
a broad and flexible approach to focus on promoting changes on 
relatively small scales in ways that hold a potential to begin a 
larger process of transformation. 
The path toward energy system reform that complexity 
suggests is far messier than an efficient and centralized 
multilateral environmental regime modeled on the Montreal 
Protocol (although it does not prevent the formation of 
Montreal-like regimes where the conditions are right for them 
                                                          
 239. See supra Part I. 
 240. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution 
Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: 
Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 151 (2003) (observing that legislation and 
other progress in protection of water quality “has often been driven by some 
sort of crisis or series of events that thrusts an issue to the forefront of 
political attention,” which results in “reactive decision-making” that may be 
“short-sighted, geared to the political necessity of addressing a single, highly 
charged issue”). 
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to flourish).241 Instead, complexity theory suggests that 
whatever hope remains for mitigating climate change at or 
near the 2º target discussed in the UNFCCC context242 and by 
the IPCC243 will only be achieved, if at all, through actions that 
accrete and trigger reactions, expanding in a nonlinear fashion 
similar to the dynamics that have created widespread concern 
over catastrophic climate change impacts beyond certain 
“tipping points.”244 The question for policymakers seeking to 
employ complexity insights must be framed in terms of 
measures that can set in motion and maintain systemic forces 
that will result in technological transformation through 
systems dynamics.245 In other words, while environmental law 
has sought to prevent systemic change through restraints on 
the inputs into physical or ecological systems, the goal of rapid 
technological transformation will only be realized through 
changes to the energy system components in ways that unleash 
systemic change forces in the global energy system. 
                                                          
 241. In fact, it has been argued that the evolution of the Montreal Protocol 
reflects complex adaptive systems properties. Matthew J. Hoffmann, Beyond 
Regime Theory: Complex Adaptation and the Ozone Regime, in COMPLEXITY IN 
WORLD POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM 95, 108–11 
(Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006). “Messy” is used here in the sense that J.B. Ruhl 
describes in Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System. 
Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 983 (describing environmental law reform as 
“local, state, and federal structures [combining] their ‘genes,’ engag[ing] in the 
political equivalent of sex, and mak[ing] the environmental law governance 
system messy in the complex adaptive systems sense”). 
 242. The Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC, http://cancun.unfccc.int/cancun-
agreements/significance-of-the-key-agreements-reached-at-cancun/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 243. Peter Frumhoff, 2º C or Not 2º C: Insights from the Latest IPCC 
Climate Report, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://blog.ucsusa.org/2-c-or-not-2-c-insights-from-the-latest-ipcc-climate-
report-255. 
 244. For a discussion of “tipping points” and climate change, see Robert 
Sanders, Report Warns of Climate Change “Tipping Points” Within Our 
Lifetime, UC BERKLEY NEWS CENTER (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
newscenter.berkeley.edu/2013/12/03/report-warns-of-climate-change-tipping-
points-within-our-lifetime/. 
 245. E.g., Farber, supra note 138, at 152–53 (discussing the more unusual 
situation of power laws, wherein “immeasurable variations in the current 
state of affairs can lead over time to arbitrarily large divergences in eventual 
outcomes”); Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 952 (describing the process by 
which relatively small changes in the governance status quo may reverberate 
through the system in ways that, over time, lead to a massive change or even 
a transformation of the system). 
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The concept of governance changes designed to promote 
systemic change forces leading to a desirable outcome in partly 
social systems has no apparent analogue in practice and has 
just begun to appear in the literature.246 The approach is 
discussed as “applied forward reasoning” in a recent article by 
Levin et al., which begins to establish a framework for 
examining specific situations based on a “reverse” application 
of what is known about path dependency.247 The authors 
suggest that exploring potential pathways through a sort of 
reverse path dependency logic may enable some assessment of 
the likelihood that particular policy changes will lead to 
desirable, large-scale systemic transformation.248 Developing 
applied forward reasoning or other in-depth analysis to identify 
specific measures that can support the type of transformation 
envisioned here may significantly reduce the uncertainty of 
efforts to promote transformation of the global energy system, 
bringing the goal more clearly within reach. 
Two general policy targets help to clarify the types of 
actions likely to advance the broader goal of dislodging fossil 
energy’s dominance: technological innovation and technological 
diffusion. These can be employed like a “rule of thumb,” such 
that they offer a direction in which policy reforms can attempt 
to move. Thus, taking actions that facilitate technological 
innovation in as many contexts and potentially viable forms as 
possible increases the chances of opening up the technological 
horizon of possibility and achieving significant technological 
breakthroughs. For example, promoting small-scale clean 
energy projects around the globe through development aid and 
policies of investment institutions serves to establish 
“laboratories” for experimentation to address the technical 
challenges of clean energy.249 Secondly, institutional 
arrangements and legal rules that affect technological diffusion 
                                                          
 246. It must be said, however, that J.B. Ruhl’s work in the late 1990s 
strongly suggests such an approach and, in that sense as well as others, serves 
as a forerunner of most of the other literature and conceptual developments 
discussed in this Article. E.g., Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 952. 
 247. Kelly Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: 
Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45 
POL’Y SCI. 123, 130–38 (2012). 
 248. Id. at 138–47. 
 249. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing “laboratories” for experimentation in the 
context of states). 
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(such as intellectual property rights laws) can be examined 
with an eye toward revision that will pave the way for rapid 
diffusion of significant technological advances. As Oran Young 
suggested in the context of environmental institutions analysis: 
“There is much to be said, under the circumstances, for 
thinking systemically about institutional options in advance, so 
that well-crafted options are available when crises open up 
windows of opportunity for the introduction of substantial 
institutional changes.”250 The same principle applies to 
technological transformation and the mitigation challenge. If 
circumstances, such as a price spike in fossil fuels, correspond 
with technological change sufficiently to enable large-scale 
change, it will be crucial to have governance arrangements in 
place that can facilitate rapid and effective diffusion of 
alternative technologies in order to maximize the opportunities 
created. These goals suggest the need for attention to 
governance relationships that, while perhaps far looser than 
traditional environmental law regimes, can create an over-
arching structure to facilitate movement toward a significantly 
lower GHG energy system. 
C. POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIPS 
Polycentric governance literature, particularly when 
understood as an application of complexity concepts to 
governance,251 suggests that challenges as complex and global 
as climate change will require multiple layers of governance 
that are designed to promote flexible experimentation and 
cooperative learning, in line with the goals discussed above.252 
The multiscalar nature of energy governance, as it currently 
exists, could become an asset by incorporating elements from 
both top-down systems and bottom-up efforts to allow small-
                                                          
 250. Oran R. Young, Institutional Dynamics: Resilience, Vulnerability and 
Adaptation in Environmental and Resource Regimes, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 378, 384 (2010). 
 251. Although polycentric governance literature is not usually explicitly 
tied to complexity concepts, the similarities are striking, particularly with 
regard to self-organization and the apparent design of polycentric governance 
structures to promote emergence through the interaction of various 
authorities within a larger governance arrangement. Consider, for example, 
the climate change governance strategy articulated in Ostrom, supra note 17, 
at 551. 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 249–50. 
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scale experimentation and facilitate global learning.253 In 
practical terms, this means enlisting “higher” scales of 
governance (e.g., international) to facilitate finance for specific 
clean energy projects and, equally important, to collect and 
transmit lessons learned from them to future projects. 
Moreover, it offers an opportunity to create guidance at the 
global or international level that can promote energy system 
improvements by fostering innovative and semi-autonomous 
efforts at smaller-scales, perhaps through aligning funding 
conditions with the global social and environmental priorities 
that can promote multi-issue initiatives, including the goal of 
technological innovation that may begin to trigger broader 
changes in the system as experience accumulates.254 To be 
effective, such arrangements will need to occur in a context 
that creates trust among participants and enables productive 
interaction, such as information sharing and technology 
diffusion.255 
D. LINKAGES AND INCENTIVES 
Coordination of efforts across multiple scales throughout 
the planet is not likely to simply self-organize for reasons 
similar to those that have stalled UNFCCC efforts to fail. Chief 
among these is the lack of incentives for many actors to accept 
short-term individualized costs solely to promote a widely 
shared future benefit.256 Accordingly, promoting innovation, 
                                                          
 253. See Underdal, supra note 123, at 389–92 (noting different models for 
collective action); see also Osofsky, supra note 2, at 241 (arguing that 
addressing climate change policy requires resolution of “regulatory problems 
that intersect with every level of government, from the most local to the most 
global”). 
 254. In a similar vein, Sovacool suggests that polycentric approaches to 
governance, which he describes as “so complex that there is no 
guarantee . . . [of] optimal forms of governance,” “can offer an equitable, 
inclusive, informative, accountable, protective, and adaptable framework” for 
addressing the panoply of social and environmental challenges involved in 
governing the global energy system. Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International 
Comparison of Four Polycentric Approaches to Climate and Energy 
Governance, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3832, 3842 (2011). 
 255. See generally Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with 
Climate Change 38–39 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
5095, 2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/2009/04268.pdf 
(recommending a multilevel approach to achieve emissions reduction). 
 256. Cf. supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting the traditional 
theories used to solve collective-action problems). 
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especially diffusion of technology, will likely depend heavily 
upon the creation of appropriate incentives through financing 
and, importantly, linkage with other significant social priorities 
in particular geographic areas. The highly interconnected 
nature of many issues related to energy creates an opportunity 
to promote local priorities while also advancing global climate 
change goals. Moreover, these considerations strongly caution 
against a “single-minded” pursuit of one objective (such as 
mitigation) to the exclusion or detriment of others (such as 
biodiversity preservation or well-being of affected 
communities). These concepts have been discussed, to some 
degree, in international environmental law literature, 
especially work related to mitigation in the land use and 
forestry sectors that advocates consideration of multiple issues 
in the design of programs and reform of legal rules. 
Many current REDD+ efforts in the forestry context have 
begun to explore incorporation of climate, biodiversity, and 
human development goals into holistic efforts.257 This is in 
stark contrast to many of the existing incentives of investment 
into developing countries for the purposes of meeting rising 
demand,258 as well as many of the international environmental 
law regimes.259 Understanding the multiple interacting 
components of the global energy system can provide practical 
guidance by highlighting the value of considering the multiple 
forces that define a particular context. Clean energy projects 
that are integrated with other priorities in specific contexts, 
such as national or local agricultural or livelihood concerns, 
may produce more robust results. 
The Brazilian transition to ethanol in the 1970s–80s 
illustrates this point and could serve as a model of sorts for 
                                                          
 257. For a related analysis in the context of forestry emissions, see Long, 
supra note 34, at 163 (“[These approaches] would overcome the fragmentation 
and persistent divisions that have plagued prior efforts to address key 
environmental issues . . . .”). For a discussion in the biodiversity context, see 
generally Arnold, supra note 125, at 798 (describing the characteristics of 
complex environmental problems and suggesting that they “demand that 
environmental law and policy become increasingly integrationist and 
multimodal”); see also Andrew Long, Developing Linkages to Preserve 
Biodiversity, 21 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 41, 58–66 (2011). 
 258. Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68, at 66 (“[F]unding on energy 
continues to support traditional centralized fossil fuel plants.”). 
 259. Long, supra note 257, at 42–43 (discussing fragmentation of 
international environmental law). 
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similar efforts on smaller scales.260 In Bangladesh, attention to 
local livelihood needs and development of innovative financing 
has enabled a broadly successful nonprofit effort to promote 
small-scale renewable technologies that have significantly 
reduced deforestation and provided direct health benefits to the 
local population.261 Conceiving of the mitigation challenge as a 
problem of reducing fossil fuel dominance in the global energy 
system, with appropriate attention to the multiplicity of 
interacting components to that system, supports developing 
internationally applicable incentives for projects of this type 
and, of equal importance, of developing the learning 
infrastructure to allow them to be replicated and, where 
possible, scaled-up. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thinking about energy as a complex system from which 
fossil fuel dominance and climate change emerge provides an 
analytical and policy-relevant framework for exploring 
pathways toward transforming that system. The linkage of 
issues and scales of authority, highlighted briefly above, are 
but two examples of how this might be operationalized.262 
Literature since the 2009 UNFCCC negotiations in 
Copenhagen is beginning to explore alternatives to top-down 
binding international environmental agreements for catalyzing 
successful mitigation, but it has yet to coalesce around an 
analytical framework that can foster synergy and the 
development of a cohesive body of work identifying and testing 
viable options that are likely to produce solid policy 
recommendations. A perspective on climate change informed by 
an understanding of the global energy system as a complex 
system has the potential to provide such a framework. 
Further exploring the potential for an interdisciplinary 
perspective on energy as a complex system may provide the 
                                                          
 260. See Sovacool, supra note 254, at 3837–38 (discussing benefits of the 
transition for workers and for soil productivity). 
 261. Id. at 3838–39. 
 262. Another possibility for affecting systemic forces is the reduction of 
fossil fuel subsidies (or introduction of taxes or other pricing mechanisms) to 
reduce the market distortions supporting fossil fuel dominance, which may 
become more politically feasible as technological development reduces the cost 
of alternatives. Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to Motorfuel: 
Tax Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 43, 79 (2008). 
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analytical framework needed to accelerate the learning process 
by uniting the somewhat disparate strands of thought that 
have emerged since the “dream of Rio,” characterized by an 
unjustified faith in global top-down environmentalism, came to 
a crashing halt at the end of 2009. A complexity perspective on 
energy as the source of climate change may unite many of the 
developing approaches, which include work exploring near-
term approaches to climate change mitigation,263 detailed 
analysis of particular aspects of the mitigation challenge if 
developed outside of a unifying top-down structure,264 and 
analytical expositions of polycentric governance theories in 
climate-relevant ways.265 Viewed as a body of literature 
addressing facets of a global complex systems challenge, such 
work can be understood to contain the seeds of an approach 
that is sufficiently salient to garner political support while also 
probing for effective tools that will engage the multiple 
interacting threads of social, ecological, and technical 
components that affect the energy system across scales in order 
to produce an overall shift that achieves climate stabilization. 
There is much work to be done if we hope to bring about 
the kind of transformation of the global energy system 
necessary to reduce GHG emissions significantly and rapidly 
enough to avoid drastic climate change impacts. A complexity 
perspective strikes an appropriate balance between resigning 
the global population to the massive suffering and 
destabilization that climate change may bring, as a narrow 
focus on developed country adaptation would do, and the 
unwarranted faith in top-down global governance that much of 
the previous decade’s climate change analysis exhibited. In this 
sense, a complexity perspective on climate change urges a form 
of governance reflecting the nature of adaptive systems 
situated on the edge of chaos—advocating enough order to 
avert disaster, while imbuing reform with the long-term 
catalytic vision necessary to bring about the emergence of that 
which is desirable, but remains uncertain and unpredictable. 
                                                          
 263. E.g., Richard B. Stewart et al., Building Blocks for Global Climate 
Protection, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 341, 343–44 (2013). 
 264. E.g., Boyd, supra note 13, at 471–72. 
 265. E.g., Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: 
Must We Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Actions 
at Other Scales?, 49 ECON. THEORY 353, 355 (2010); Sovacool, supra note 254, 
at 3835–40. 
  
*** 
